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India’s economic policies have evolved significantly since its independence in 
1947. The evolution of the policies can be assessed by the unique domestic and 
international environment that existed during the most pivotal parts of India’s economic 
history. This research explores some of the most notable parts of India’s political 
economy and analyzes the domestic and international factors during that time. The 
research concludes that India’s political economy is undoubtedly influenced by both 
types of factors. More surprisingly, the relative weight of domestic versus international 
factors has been gradually shifting in the past six decades.  
The changing dynamic of how India’s economic policies are made is useful in 
understanding what shapes public policy in the world’s largest democracy, and how both 
Indian and international actors can best seek to impact the country’s economic policies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Since gaining independence in 1947, Indian economic growth has been slow and 
sporadic. Economic growth averaged between 2–3 percent annually before rising to an 
average of 6–8 percent growth after 1991.1 Initially, Indian policy makers adopted a 
socialism-inspired economic plan that remained in place until the mid-1980s. Then, in the 
1980s, Indian economic policy began transitioning toward market liberalism, leading to 
an eventual adoption of free-market principles in 1991 under Narsimha Rao’s leadership. 
What drove Indian economic policy decisions from independence to 1980, 1980 to 1991, 
and 1992 onward? In particular, how did domestic and international influences interact to 
affect Indian economic policy-making? And how did the influence of domestic and 
international factors shift over the different time periods in influencing India’s economic 
policy? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
This thesis builds on a large variety of scholarship on India’s economic policy and 
performance. Much of the existing literature focuses on one of the three aforementioned 
economic periods and ascribes causal factors that are unique to that time. Studies of the 
post-independence time period typically focus on Indian colonial history as a “deep 
determinant”2 of the policies that were adopted. The second time period, which involved 
the first shift of economic policy toward market liberalization, is typically described in 
terms of either internal political pressures or exogenous forces that forced the hand of 
Indian politicians. Finally, the third and most recent era of India finally embracing free-
market economics is generally described as an eventuality in line with the predictions of 
                                                 
1 Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, India After Independence: 1947–2000 
(New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2000). 
2 Dani Rodrik, “Institutions, Integration, and Geography: In Search of the Deep Determinants of 
Economic Growth,” Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 2002, 1, http://wcfia.harvard.edu/
publications/institutions-integration-and-geography-search-deep-determinants-economic-growth. 
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modernization theory.3 Each of these periods is unique and demarcated by a significant 
event. However, it is not often a single causal factor, but a confluence of unique 
circumstances that shapes a government’s decision making.  
The significance of this study is threefold. First, this thesis studies the domestic 
and international political situations that existed during the three economic time periods. 
It aims to determine the undercurrents in the domestic and international environments, 
how the forces interacted at different times, and how the international and domestic 
environments influenced Indian politicians’ approach toward economic development. 
Second, Indian economic development is forecasted to exhibit economic growth at a rate 
and length that could surpass China’s meteoric ascent.4 With a quickly industrializing 
economy and a population expected to become the largest in the world by 2025, Indian 
modernization is a near certainty.5 An assessment of how Indian politics has responded to 
various influences and events in the past may help predict future policy decisions. Third, 
international institutions’ consensus on the correct policies for economic growth can have 
a large influence on policies adopted by developing countries. Historically, these 
institutions have evolved their policy recommendations depending on current events at 
the time. The Washington Consensus was dominant in the 1980s and 1990s, and is now 
overshadowed by the Beijing Consensus; waiting in the wings for its moment is the 
Mumbai Consensus.6 Each of these consensuses was a package of policies tailored to the 
economic challenges of its time. Understanding the influences to India’s economic policy 
will be essential to understanding the scope and impact of the forthcoming Mumbai 
Consensus. 
                                                 
3 Alexander Gerschenkron, “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective,” in Economic 
Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1979), 5–30. 
4 Christine Lagarde, “Seizing India’s Moment” (Speech, Lady Shri Ram College, New Delhi, India, 
March 16, 2015), https://agenda.weforum.org/2015/11/india-economy-will-roar-viraj-mehta/. 
5 Ibid. 




This thesis evaluates the various domestic and international influences on Indian 
politicians as they charted the country’s economic course. The unique set of 
environmental circumstances present during India’s independence led it toward a 
socialist-inclined economic policy. As that particular set of circumstances ebbed, a new 
set of domestic and international factors began to exert influence on India in the late 
1970s to early 1980s, leading politicians to revisit their assumptions about economic 
growth. Finally, the most recent era of Indian economic history has had its own unique 
characteristics, which have been shaped by endogenous domestic and exogenous 
international factors, and the interactions between them.  
The hypothesis of this thesis is that India’s economy policy-making has been 
influenced by a combination of domestic and international factors. In each period, one 
has been more prominent in shaping India’s political economy. This thesis proposes that 
India’s economic trajectory is most accurately explained through an analysis that 
combines our understanding of domestic and international factors, especially 
emphasizing how they have interacted over time in shaping periods of political economic 
policy-making. These periods, after being defined by either endogenous or exogenous 
factors, can change by shifting influence from one factor to the other (i.e., endogenous to 
exogenous), or by a change in the direction within the factor (i.e., endogenous populism 
to endogenous market-liberalism). 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Due to the scope of this research question, a large selection of literature is 
applicable in understanding the weight of domestic and international factors on economic 
policy-making. Section 1, which follows, reviews existing literature on economic growth 
theories. This literature is not specific to India, but lays the groundwork for 
understanding various approaches to economic growth. All the theories covered generally 
apply to various phases in India’s economic history. Section 2 surveys the literature on 
the three different periods of India’s economic history. While this portion of the literature 
review introduces the relevance of different economic theories into Indian economic 
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history, the purpose of this section is to holistically document the global and domestic 
environments in India during each of the periods. 
1. Economic Growth Theory 
Competing theories of economic growth offer different perspectives through 
which to understand India’s adoption of specific economic policies at different points in 
its history. This section focuses on the competing economic prescriptions for fostering 
growth from different schools of economic thought, ranging from neoclassical 
economics, to convergence theory, institutional legacy and path dependency, the 
developmental state, and socialism. 
a. Neoclassical Economics 
Neoclassical economic growth theory prescribes minimal intervention by the 
government in the economy. The requirement for neoclassical free-market economic 
growth theory is based on the existence of an unencumbered price signal, a concept first 
explained by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations and further developed by 20th 
century economists such as Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman.7 The neoclassical 
interpretation of free-market economics leaves few responsibilities for the state aside 
from providing public goods, administering rule of law, and national security. Though 
nearly impossible to implement and sustain in its pure theoretical form, neoclassical 
economics provides the principles that govern a free-market economy. In practice, free-
market economies and countries that are transitioning to the free-market model balance 
an ebb and flow in the level of involvement that society either needs or demands from the 
government.8 Reviewing neoclassical economic theory is useful for understanding what 
Indian politicians believed economic reforms would accomplish. The next three 
                                                 
7 Adam Smith, “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,” in The Political 
Economy Reader: Markets as Institutions, ed. Naazneen Barma and Steven Kent Vogel (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2008), 27–40; Friedrich Hayek, “The Road to Serfdom,” in The Political Economy Reader: 
Markets as Institutions, ed. Naazneen Barma and Steven Kent Vogel (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 
91–106; Milton Friedman, “Capitalism and Freedom,” in The Political Economy Reader: Markets as 
Institutions, ed. Steven Kent Vogel and Naazneen Barma (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 107–16. 
8 Karl Polanyi, “The Great Transformation,” in The Political Economy Reader: Markets as 
Institutions, ed. Naazneen Barma and Steven Kent Vogel (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 121–52. 
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established schools of thought use neoclassical principles as a foundation upon which to 
develop more specific theories of growth. 
b. Convergence through Modernization Theory 
Contemporary literature in convergence theory builds on the ability of free-market 
economics to build wealth and adds the dimension that some countries or regions will 
modernize or experience economic growth before others due to a variety of factors such 
as technological, geological, cultural, or resource-based advantages. Regardless of the 
motivator of the initial economic growth, convergence theory assumes that the country’s 
leading economic development will face lower rates of growth as they explore new 
technologies and incur large investment costs in their quest for growth.  
On the other hand, developing countries have the advantage of mimicking the 
leading countries, and will therefore be able to implement technologies and policies that 
are most effective at generating economic growth, modernize at a faster rate, and 
economically converge with the leading countries at the top of the “ladder of 
development.”9 Convergence theorists simplify modernization into a singular path that 
will necessarily lead to economic growth eventually. Applied to cases such as India, this 
argument would imply that the evolutions of India’s economic policies were due to 
gradual modernization as part of the natural order of a state’s economic development. 
This argument is dissected by several authors who argue that there are several factors that 
contribute to if a country is able to economically modernize or not. Factors such as social 
capability, political institutions, and the country’s economic starting point play a role in 
shaping future economic modernization.10 Furthermore, authors such as Samuel 
Huntington and Richard Florida argue that there is actually very little convergence 
occurring at a global scale. Instead, convergence is happening to a smaller extent at 
various different points in the economic spectrum across the globe, leading to a collection 
                                                 
9 Gerschenkron, “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective,” 729. 
10 Lant Pritchett, “Divergence, Big Time,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 3 (1997): 3–
17; Moses Abramovitz, “Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind,” The Journal of Economic 
History 46, no. 2 (1986): 385–406. 
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of very rich, moderately rich, and poor cities and countries around the world.11 Applying 
modernization theory and its opposing viewpoints to Indian economic development does 
not yield a satisfying answer to its economic trajectory. India is modernizing, but in fits 
and starts. It is developing “hills and valleys”12 of economic growth, but not in ways that 
can be explained by existing theory. 
c. Institutional Legacy and Path Dependency 
“Deep Determinants” is a phrase coined by Dani Rodrik to explain the lasting 
impacts of geography, culture, historical trajectories, and previous institutions on the 
development of a country.13 The search for explanatory differentiators emerged as a 
response to the assertions of convergence theory: If convergence was empirically not 
happening, why not?14 Here, I focus on the arguments for historical trajectories and 
institutional legacies in India as an influence in future economic policy decisions.  
Historical trajectories are often manifested through the lasting impacts of a former 
colonial power. The manner in which they impact their colonies’ future development 
varies. The current schools of thought give significance to the governmental institutions 
established in the colonies, educational systems, length of colonization, the colonizer’s 
domestic governing institutions, degrees of mercantilism, and approach to free trade.15 
Granted, the impact of a colonial history can be significant and lasting. However, given 
                                                 
11 Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Order and Political Decay,” in Political Order in Changing 
Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2006), 32–92; Richard Florida, “The World Is Spiky: 
Globalization Has Changed the Economic Playing Field, But Hasn’t Leveled It,” in Essential Readings in 
Comparative Politics, ed. Patrick H. O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski, 4th ed. (New York, NY: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 2010), 590–95. 
12 Florida, “The World Is Spiky,” 591. 
13 Rodrik, “In Search of Deep Determinants.” 
14 Gregory Clark, “Why Isn’t the Whole World Developed? Lessons from the Cotton Mills,” The 
Journal of Economic History 47, no. 1 (1987): 141–73. 
15 Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer, “History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy 
of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India,” American Economic Review 95, no. 4 (2005): 1190–1213, 
doi:10.1257/0002828054825574; Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The 
Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper Series No. 7771 (2000), doi:10.3386/w7771; Kevin B. Grier and Gordon Tullock, 
“An Empirical Analysis of Cross-National Economic Growth, 1951–1980,” Journal of Monetary 
Economics 24, no. 2 (September 1989): 259–76, doi:10.1016/0304-3932(89)90006-8; Robin M. Grier, 
“Colonial Legacies and Economic Growth,” Public Choice 98, no. 3/4 (1999): 317–35. 
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that a single colonial power controlled multiple colonies, and these myriad colonies 
experienced significantly different economic outcomes after gaining independence, the 
colonial deep determinant theory leaves gaps in the explanation.  
Institutional legacy serves as a deep determinant in that an initial set of 
circumstances drive economic growth in a particular direction.16 The institutional order 
then begins to gain momentum and begets future institutions and policies, which then 
increase the costs of changing course. The related argument to institutions shaping 
economic policy is that a well-designed institutional system serves as a catalyst for 
economic policy decisions, regardless of what motivated them.17 Specific to India is the 
argument that the institutional legacies of British colonialism and early Indian 
administrations laid the support structures for a robust economy, left only to be triggered 
by a major policy decision; various authors argue whether that triggering decision 
occurred in the 1980s or 1990s.18  
While each of these arguments has their merits, they give little credence to human 
agency, which has overcome the bindings of deep determinants in various cases around 
the world. Specifically, for India, the study of colonial and institutional deep 
determinants provides a foundation upon which to base further study. 
d. The Developmental State 
A large body of work exists on the concept of the “developmental state,” first 
coined by Chalmers Johnson.19 The developmental state is a market-based approach to 
governing that hinges on strong cooperation between the public and private sectors of a 
                                                 
16 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3. 
17 Rodrik, “In Search of Deep Determinants,” 19. 
18 J. Bradford DeLong, “India Since Independence: An Analytic Growth Narrative,” in In Search of 
Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth, ed. Dani Rodrik (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), 190. 
19 Chalmers Johnson, “Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business 
Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,” in The Political Economy of the New Asian 
Industrialism, ed. Frederic C. Deyo, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1987), 136–64. 
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country.20 Johnson’s concept is based on four pillars: a stable bureaucratic elite, public-
private cooperation in forming and executing industrial policy, government investment in 
education, and a free-market price mechanism (using the free market to determine where 
government investment would be best utilized). Although India has historically 
underperformed on the pillars of a developmental state as outlined by Johnson, studying 
the successful cases of the developmental state is valuable for identifying how the 
relationships between the public and private sectors of a country can impact its future 
development.21 In the Korean example, the relationship between the public and private 
sectors was based on the government providing direction for where the country’s 
industrial investments should go, and then having the large private sector corporations 
follow that direction in exchange for trade protection and other benefits from the 
government. The somewhat subordinate relationship of the corporations to the 
government, combined with steady government direction can be accredited with driving 
economic growth in South Korea.  
Comparatively, as Atul Kohli observes, India had stable governing regimes in its 
early history, but could not foster the same relationship with its private sector.22 Instead, 
the private sector was able to secure import protection from the government without 
providing concessions in exchange. The differences between the Korean and Indian cases 
can be useful in explaining why Indian leaders either chose to, or were forced to, adopt 
certain economic policies. For instance, the relationship between the public and private 
sector in India was very different from their relationship in South Korea. Whereas the 
Korean private sector was relatively deferential to the state for developing and 
implementing economic policies, the Indian private sector lobbied to eliminate economic 
policies that imposed rules or competition while keeping or expanding policies that 
provided subsidies or protected them from competition.23 Understanding why the Korean 
                                                 
20 Richard F. Doner, Bryan K. Ritchie, and Dan Slater, “Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of 
Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective,” International 
Organization 59, no. 02 (2005): 327–61, doi:10.1017/S0020818305050113. 
21 Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global 




state was able to limit private-sector influence in economic policy-making, and the Indian 
state was not, is useful in characterizing the strength of domestic influences in economic 
policy making. 
e. Socialism 
Concluding this review of the theoretical models of economic growth is socialism. 
Socialism, as advocated by Karl Marx, is a political and economic theory based on 
control of the means of production. Socialism prescribes a strong central government 
with the warrant to direct economic production throughout the country based on centrally 
decided goals. It emerged as a school of thought in the early 20th century as a reaction to 
growing wealth disparities and the economic exploitation of the working-class by societal 
elites.24 This parallels the way Indian leaders would later view the British exploitation of 
India.25 Following its independence in 1947, India’s decision to follow a socialist-
inclined economic policy was largely influenced by its first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal 
Nehru.26 Having been witness to British colonial exploitation, Nehru believed in the 
promises of the socialist agenda. As the premiere statesman for the Indian independence 
movement, Nehru was exposed to various international influences, the mix of which led 
him to believe socialism and a state-directed economy would be most beneficial for 
India.27 Reviewing literature on the socialist ideology will be useful for framing the 
perceived benefits of its policy prescriptions. Combined with the domestic economic 
situation in India at the time, this literature can help answer why Nehru advocated for a 
socialist economy. 
                                                 
24 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The Communist Manifesto,” in The Political Economy Reader: 
Markets as Institutions, ed. Naazneen Barma and Steven Kent Vogel (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 
41–62. 
25 Chandra, Mukherjee, and Mukherjee, India after Independence, chap. 25. 
26 Kohli, State-Directed Development, 228. 
27 DeLong, “India Since Independence”; Kohli, State-Directed Development; Atul Kohli, Poverty 
Amid Plenty in the New India (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Lloyd I. Rudolph and 
Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
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2. Indian Political–Economic History 
India’s political–economic history can be broken out into three distinct segments. 
First, the Nehruvian period, which lasted from India’s independence in 1947 to 1980. 
Though Nehru died in 1964, his economic legacy dominated policy until the late 1970s. 
The second period, from 1980–1991, is best characterized as an economically transitional 
period, and is bookended by one subtle and one momentous event. Finally, the third 
economic period begins in 1992 and is ongoing. 
a. The Indian Economy: Independence to 1980 
An ample number of studies have identified the endogenous and exogenous 
factors that influenced India’s economic policies following its independence in 1947. 
Existing literature on the era immediately after independence focuses on the Indian 
political recoil from decades of colonialism. Since British colonialism specifically is 
credited with establishing many Indian political and economic institutions, the Indian 
political economy is often characterized as a recoil from its colonial past.  
On the economic front in particular, being exploited by a foreign capitalist power 
tilted Indian politics toward sovereignty and socialism.28 Since Indian foreign policy was 
an implementation of its economic perspective, it is worth considering how India’s 
foreign policy was also shaped by her colonial legacy. Did a self-reliant foreign policy, 
chosen by Indian politicians still reeling from colonization, lead India to adopt an 
economic policy that focused more on organic economic growth than a globalized 
economic policy? The literature on Indian international relations immediately after 
independence describes the emergence of a “non-aligned” foreign policy as a reaction to 
the same foreign exploitation that drove India’s socialist economic policies.29 Also 
                                                 
28 Chandra, Mukherjee, and Mukherjee, India after Independence, 9, 47; B. R. Tomlinson, The 
Political Economy of the Raj, 1914–1947: The Economics of Decolonization in India, Cambridge 
Commonwealth Series (London: Macmillan Press, 1979).  
29 Itty Abraham, “From Bandung to NAM: Non-Alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947–65,” 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 46, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 10; Chandra, Mukherjee, and Mukherjee, 
India after Independence, 36; “History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement,” Government of India: 
Ministry of External Affairs, August 22, 2012, http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/
History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement; Rajen Harshe, “India’s Non-Alignment: An Attempt 
at Conceptual Reconstruction,” Economic and Political Weekly 25, no. 7 (February 24, 1990): 399. 
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contributing to India’s socialist tilt were Nehru’s personal inclinations. He was initially 
attracted to the idea because of its nationalist underpinnings. Reacting to British 
oppression and exploitation, Nehru sought an independent Indian government that could 
provide economic security and liberty, ideals he believed attainable only through central 
planning.30 
The socialist path that India set out on shaped the next four decades of Indian 
economic history. The Nehru/Gandhi ruling coalition advocated for an inclusive, but self-
reliant, culture with villages as the driving force for growth and development.31 In the 
1950s, possibly reacting to China’s communist model, India tried to balance a mixed 
capitalist and economist model, combining state-led planning with a small role for the 
market. Over the next 30 years, the attempt to cohabitate these two economic models led 
to an era where a “complex bureaucratic process had stifled entrepreneurship and resulted 
in decades of slow economic growth,”32 while at the same time not delivering the social 
justice promises of the socialist ideology. 
Despite there being substantial literature on the economic and foreign policies of 
India, they are often portrayed as the end results. After India adopted certain policies, the 
iterative feedback loop of how their implementation impacted the future political 
economy is overlooked. In other words, questions such as how the implementation of 
India’s initial economic policies altered its domestic and international contexts and how 
those contexts then impacted future economic decisions are typically left unaddressed. 
Furthermore, since India’s domestic political economy and foreign policy are large 
enough areas of study in their own rights, very little of the literature focuses on the areas 
where they interacted with each other in informing Indian economic policies during her 
socialism inclined period. 
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31 Kohli, State-Directed Development, 290; Lydia Powell, “India’s Modern Economic History: A 
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b. The Indian Economy: 1980–1991 
When considering the three different eras of Indian economic policy, this one is 
characterized by a gradual shift toward free-market principles. Economic reforms, which 
were a response to a macroeconomic balance of payments crisis, included tax reforms, 
removal of tariffs and barriers to foreign capital investment, and prudent management of 
currency exchange rates. Since the reforms were implemented gradually, and not 
bookended by singular events, the literature varies on what years this time period 
comprises. Some authors propose it began as early as 1965,33 whereas others claim it 
began as late as 1991.34 This literature review will use the issuance of India’s 6th Five-
Year Plan in 1980 and 8th Five-Year Plan in 1992 to demarcate India’s economic 
transition period as between 1980 and 1991.  
The causal factors affecting economic policy choices in this intermediate era are 
characterized in the literature in one of two ways. The transition to liberalization is either 
explained on the basis of influence from external actors35 or due to a gradual realization 
that the “authoritarianism cum growth model”36 was not comprehensive enough for 
growth in developing countries, capturing the influence of domestic politics.  
(1) External Influence: 1980–1991 
Even among the category of external influences to India’s economic policies, 
experts cite several different factors with varying degrees of significance assigned to 
each. In his book, State Directed Development, Atul Kohli argues for the significance of 
shifting global perceptions on growth; one toward neo-liberal economic policies.37 
Liberalizing economic policy typically engenders significant opposition from those who 
stand to lose their privileges. Therefore, having the support of the international 
                                                 
33 Chandra, Mukherjee, and Mukherjee, India after Independence, 351. 
34 Kohli, Poverty Amid Plenty; Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, DC: 
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35 Kohli, Poverty Amid Plenty, 95. 
36 Rudolph and Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi, 222. 
37 Kohli, State-Directed Development, 349. 
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community to undertake reform is “deemed crucial” by economic reformists.38 This 
argument would suggest that political leaders are already motivated to pursue reforms, 
and international consensus makes it easier for them. However, it does not address how a 
shifting global perception on economic reforms can itself incite leaders to pursue reform. 
An argument for what drove politicians to pursue reform can be pulled straight 
from Kenneth Waltz’ “Balance of Power” theory.39 As suggested by Jeff Smith and 
others, India’s military loss to China in the 1962 war was attributed to China’s superior 
military, which was financed by an industrialization boom in China. Leaving aside the 
negative societal consequences of the concurrent Great Leap Forward, China’s military 
was well funded during this era.40 This argument suggests that Indian politicians were at 
least partly motivated to pursue economic reforms because of a need to strengthen the 
military; gains from shifting to a free-market economy could be used to help fund the 
military.41 While this is a compelling argument, it puts a lot of weight on a single causal 
factor; economic reforms are not typically the first logical step toward modernizing a 
military.  
A third international influence, as argued by Shyam Kamath, and supported by 
declassified CIA reports, is that the United States and Soviet Union were both funneling 
billions of dollars in economic aid to India in an effort to keep India from aligning with 
the other side.42 The argument suggests that as international aid from both blocs began to 
wane when the Soviet Union weakened, the Indian economy began to face fiscal troubles, 
further altering the political calculus that led to economic reforms. 
38 Kohli, Poverty Amid Plenty, 95. 
39 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reductionist and Systemic Theories,” in Theory of International Politics, 1st ed 
(Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 60–128. 
40 Henry Kissinger, On China, Kindle Edition (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2012), chap. 4. 
41 Jeff Smith, Cold Peace: China-India Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2015); John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle, 
WA: University of Washington Press, 2001); Peter B. Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States & Industrial 
Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 5. 
42 Shyam J. Kamath, Foreign Aid and India: Financing the Leviathan State (Washington, DC: CATO 
Institute, 1992); “Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDCs: Holding Their Own in 
1986,” Intelligence Assessment, (1988), http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/
89801/DOC_0000498651.pdf. 
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(2) Domestic Influence: 1980–1991 
Various experts cite domestic influence as a driver for Indian economic reform. 
One such argument by Atul Kohli suggests that as the shifting composition of the Indian 
economy from agriculture toward industry and the service-sector played a large part in 
developing political support reform.43 Another argument suggests that the domestic 
politics tilt toward reform was a product of overly populist policies in the late 1970s.44 
After years of economic stagnation brought about by populism, a lack of public 
investment led to the realization by the business classes that relying on the government 
for capital investment was not sustainable.45 Therefore, when the government 
implemented private sector reforms in the early 1980s, “big businesses welcomed them 
effusively.”46 Other arguments suggest the significance of a balance of payments crisis, 
growing influence of regional versus national politics,47 and the maturing of small/
medium size businesses and their commensurate middle-class populations as other 
domestic imperatives that drove economic reforms.48 
(3) A Holistic Assessment: 1980–1991 
1980 to 1991 was an important part of Indian economy history; many disparate 
events leading up to, and during, this period has been cited as factors that eventually led 
to economic reforms. However, as mentioned earlier, both the international and domestic 
factors are so expansive that attempts to understand them have to approach one as 
43 Kohli, Poverty Amid Plenty, 100. 
44 Ibid., 89. 
45 The largest source of industrial investment in India at the time was the government. As populist 
policies shifted expenditure of government resources toward subsidies, it resulted in a shortage of industrial 
investment, which then resulted in economic stagnation in the following years as industrialization 
stagnated. 
46 Kohli, Poverty Amid Plenty, 102; Rudolph and Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi, 241. 
47 Chandra, Mukherjee, and Mukherjee, India after Independence, 362; Rudolph and Rudolph, In 
Pursuit of Lakshmi, 205, 242. 
48 Evans, Embedded Autonomy, 168–73. 
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primary and the other as secondary. A holistic look at all the various factors and their 
interplay throughout this time period is missing from the existing literature. 
c. Indian Economy: 1992–2015 
The 1991 liberal economic reforms enacted by then Prime Minister Narasimha 
Rao and his finance minister, Manmohan Singh, produced very quick results. Indian GDP 
growth was catapulted from a historical average of 2–3 percent, and 1991’s paltry 0.8 
percent, to 7.5 percent in the following four years, and an average of 6.8 percent from 
1992–2014.49 The end result of this has been a concentration of wealth along regional, 
urban, and class lines, causing domestic pressures to ensure equal growth.50 
Internationally, India has seen a large influx of foreign direct investment, but this also has 
been only toward certain regions and cities. The era after the 1991 economic reforms has 
been characterized by a globalized approach to economic development, a growing 
domestic economy, but also increased economic inequality within the population. 
(1) External Influence: 1992–2015 
The 1990s ended with two significant events that impacted India’s economic 
policy. First was India’s test of a nuclear bomb in 1998. Internationally, the nuclear tests 
were unexpected and drew various economic sanctions, but the sanctions were 
inconsequential and short-lived.51 Furthermore, the Kargil War with Pakistan in 1999 
also had only temporary impacts on the Indian economy. As suggested by Teresita 
Schaffer, by the end of the 1990s, the economic reforms from earlier in the decade had 
already enriched India to where the influence of international pressure was reduced.52 
Furthermore, India had begun evolving its initial non-aligned policy into one of “multi-
alignment,” as defined in a report by the influential Indian think-tank, the Centre for 
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Policy Research. While this report does not represent an official Indian position, its 
contributors are immensely influential in the policy-making process. Whereas non-
alignment sought to minimize foreign influence in Indian policy-making, multi-alignment 
accepts the constant exogenous pressures. Therefore, as the report argues, a multi-aligned 
foreign policy of engaging all economic and political partners would strengthen India to a 
point where it could resist international influence.53 
The global economic environment during this era was also leaning toward 
economic liberalization. The Chinese example of transitioning to a market-based 
economic model had demonstrated sustained unprecedented economic growth.54 The 
United States and Western Europe were just finishing a decade of economic liberalization 
and continuing to reduce market regulation, leading to the longest economic expansion in 
U.S. history.55 The global economy was clearly rewarding countries with market-liberal 
economic policies, an international trend that India could not ignore as it sought 
international political, economic, and military credibility.  
(2) Domestic Influence: 1992–2015 
Since 1991, India’s domestic politics have been enormously influential in shaping 
economic policy-making. The economic growth as a result of the 1991 economic reforms 
and the continued liberalization of the Indian economy and licensing apparatus has 
created a large, relatively wealthy, and vocal middle class. As argued by Rahul Mukherji, 
economic reforms have produced winners in the corporate sector and middle class. Pro-
reform groups and small to medium size business owners united a large portion of the 
population in support for continued economic reforms. On the other side, leftist parties, 
trade unions, and left-wing economists sought to undo the market reforms, but they were 
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too splintered to mount an effective opposition.56 As the middle class amassed wealth 
and power under the new economic system, it become increasingly vocal about 
continuing economic liberalization at almost any cost.57 The result of the emergence of 
the Indian middle class has been a shift in economic decision making from the national to 
the state levels. Kohli argues that this has concentrated economic growth to certain 
sectors of the population: mostly educated English-speaking Indians in the engineering, 
transportation, tech, and banking industries. These and other emerging industries are 
concentrated in a handful of states, capturing a large part of the country’s total economic 
growth.58 As a result, “some Indian states are growing rapidly, while others are not,” due 
to the comparative advantages and individual political economies of each state.59 Recent 
literature suggests that the biggest influences to Indian economic policy-making are the 
growing middle class and growing income inequality.60  
(3) A Holistic Assessment: 1992–2015 
The era after India’s economic liberalization dramatically shifted the importance 
and influence of both international and domestic factors. With its newfound wealth, India 
appears to have been able to insulate itself from international economic headwinds. 
Internally, a newly enriched and vocal middle-class continues to push for continued 
liberalization. However, as with the previous era, existing literature typically explores 
either India’s newly empowered international presence or emerging middle class due to 
the scope of each topic. This leaves unanswered what the impact of globalization was on 
the Indian middle class, why it was able to so quickly transition away from decades of 
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state-led economic policy-making, and how it was able to the knowledge and organize 
itself to continue influencing the country’s political economy. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis focuses specifically on how domestic and international pressures 
shaped Indian politicians and the population in deciding what economic policies would 
be most advantageous for them. This chapter has reviewed the economic theories that 
apply to India’s development. With a broad brush, this chapter also assessed the major 
trends in each of India’s economic periods. Chapter II narrows the focus to India’s first 
economic period and considers the major domestic and international factors that shaped 
its socialist economic policy. Chapter III does the same for India’s transitional economic 
period, and Chapter IV provides an in-depth look at India’s current globalized economic 
period. Finally, Chapter V draws conclusions about the domestic and international events 
that shaped India’s past and reflects on how their relevance has ebbed and flowed. 
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II. INDIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY: 1947–1979 
Long years ago we made a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes 
when we shall redeem our pledge… To bring freedom and opportunity to 
the common man, to the peasants and workers of India; to fight and end 
poverty and ignorance and disease; to build up a prosperous, democratic 
and progressive nation, and to create social, economic and political 
institutions which will ensure justice and fullness of life to every man and 
woman. 
 —Jawaharlal Nehru61 
A. 1947–1979 AT A GLANCE 
When India gained independence in 1947, the economic situation was dire. 
Almost half its population was living under the poverty line, the infant mortality rate was 
nearly 20 percent, agricultural productivity was low, incomes were stagnant, and 
industrial development was stunted.62 Indian politicians, headed by the first Prime 
Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, were faced with the challenge of strengthening the nascent 
nation.  
The time period from 1947–1979 was one with many significant domestic and 
international trends and events. This chapter looks at two of the most consequential 
events for the Indian economy during this period—industrial policies adopted after 
independence, shaped by import substitution industrialization, and the green revolution—
and review the domestic and international trends that shaped them.  
B. INDIA’S INDUSTRIAL POLICIES 
In 1947, India adopted an industrial policy of import substitution industrialization 
(ISI). This strategy for rapid industrialization and economic development strategy was 
utilized by developing countries around the world, especially South America, based on 
the belief that it would accelerate countries’ industrialization efforts. ISI policy 
prescriptions are based on Keynesian economic principles that advocate a role for the 
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government in managing the development of a country’s economic sectors. The standard 
application of these policies during the post–WWII time period was in the heavy 
industries: steel, mining, shipbuilding, and other such sectors. 
India adopted policies relatively in line with the usual ISI prescriptions. Under 
political pressure to pursue a self-reliant economy, India’s leaders enacted policies that 
“emphasized the growth and long-term development of heavy capital goods industries 
run by the state with largely indigenous technology.”63 As early as 1931, politicians 
envisioning the future of India had resolved that, among other things, “the State shall own 
or control key industries and services, mineral resources, railways, waterways, shipping 
and other means of public transport.”64 According to Atul Kohli, Nehru believed that 
private firms could not be trusted with every sector of the Indian economy. Therefore, the 
private sector had significant restrictions on investment and production limits imposed on 
it. This was borne out of a desire to achieve rapid economic growth with equity for all 
sectors of the population; as stated by Kohli, “the nationalist commitments of India’s 
leaders translated into a suspicion of an open economy and a preference for heavy 
industry.”65 
Nehru and other politicians chose heavy industrialization and ISI-based trade 
policies in large part because of how easily they were influenced by political decrees, 
more so than agriculture or land reform that were parts of ISI strategies in other 
developing countries.66 Additionally, the selection of these particular policies was 
influenced by a number of domestic and international trends. Chapter II analyzes a few of 
the more prominent trends that led Indian leaders to adopt their particular 
industrialization policies. 
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1. Domestic Influences 
Indian independence leaders entered office with their own visions of what the 
country’s economy should look like, who it should benefit, and how to accomplish those 
two goals. However, domestic pressures prompted shifts in which economic policies 
were applied and how they were structured. This section will discuss some of the more 
significant domestic influences on India’s political economy: self-reliance, the Nehruvian 
vision, industrialization, trade policies, and the rise of industrial conglomerates.  
a. Indian Self-Reliance 
As evidenced by the quote from Nehru’s Tryst with Destiny speech, Indian leaders 
recognized that they were faced with the daunting task of both modernizing the country 
and lifting millions of Indians out of poverty. The revolution, which brought about Indian 
independence, had to encompass social and economic change, not just political. 
Furthermore, British colonization had left Indians with a bad taste for foreign 
involvement, equating any foreign political or economic influence with imperialism. As 
Nehru envisioned it, the objective was to “unleash forces from below among our 
people,… to build up the community and the individual,… [and to] aim at progressively 
producing a measure of equality in opportunity and other things.”67 Chandra and 
Mukherjee best describe the sentiment, noting that after independence, “the vision of a 
self-reliant independent economy was developed and popularized. Self-reliance was 
defined… as avoidance of a subordinate position in the world economy.”68 This vision of 
a “self-reliant independent economy” did not bar India from participation in a global 
economy, but focused on rapid industrialization through the creation of indigenous 
industries. 
b. Nehru’s Vision for India 
The concept of a free India, as envisioned by the Indian National Congress (INC), 
was to be a democratic country that could also pursue rapid industrialization and 
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economic growth. Nehru and other leaders in the independence movement, Gandhians, 
socialists, capitalists, as well as communists, were united in that goal. This coalition also 
recognized that pursuing rapid industrialization under a democratic banner was 
unprecedented.69 Around the world, every other country that was pursuing rapid 
industrialization was doing so under an authoritarian regime. As was demonstrated in 
countries such as South Korea and Japan, an authoritarian regime was able insulate itself 
from popular recourse when enacting systemic changes to a country’s economy. 
Discontented segments of the population could complain, but were less likely to be able 
to affect significant change in economic policy. India, however, was attempting the same 
industrialization policies as a democracy. While having a popular mandate from the 
electorate did give Nehru and other politicians credibility, they were not as immune to 
political lobbying as their authoritarian counterparts. As Nehru tried to enact his vision of 
a socialistic industrial state, he found himself conceding to various interests in the 
industrial sectors. 
Nehru’s version of socialism was democratic socialism. Viewing capitalism as 
inherently anti-social, Nehru’s philosophy conceded that a private sector was necessary to 
technology-driven industrialization.70 With that concession, Nehru still favored a role for 
the government in shaping economic structures and the rules that would govern it, while 
allowing private enterprise to operate within those limitations. Furthermore, he advocated 
for economic sectors where public and private companies operated in an effort to 
“counteract the anti-social side of capitalism.”71 For politicians in the Indian National 
Congress party, counteracting the anti-social side of capitalism meant ending poverty, 
inequality of opportunity, and maintaining human rights and quality of life. The goal was 
for this to be achieved by making families and towns the binding factor for India’s vast 
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population. By fostering an idyllic relationship between various peoples, towns, and 
religions, the Indian population could attain unity as a nation.72 
Nehru also realized that the implementation of this ideology could not be rushed. 
For nearly 20 years after independence, he shaped policy setting up what he believed 
were the critical points of his vision for India. In 1964, Nehru’s Indian National Congress 
party posited four points in the Bhubaneswar Resolution to describe his vision for Indian 
socialism: 
1. that the essential requirements of food, clothing, housing, education and 
health of every man, woman and child in the country are satisfied; 
2. that, as a means to the above end as well as because of the intrinsic value 
that should be attached to social justice in a viable democracy, large 
disparities that exist in the economic and social status of different sections 
of the community should be narrowed down; 
3. that necessary changes in the ways of thinking and in the ways of living of 
the people be brought about democratically so as to facilitate the full 
growth of human personality which alone would make it possible for the 
full utilization [sic] of the enormous human resources which the country is 
endowed with; and 
4. that the Nation should set before itself the task of realizing these 
objectives substantially by the end of the Fifth Plan.73 
Nehru was an immensely influential figure in shaping India’s policies following 
independence. Being one of India’s founding leaders, his close association with Gandhi, 
and the sheer fact that he was the head of the Indian National Congress party afforded 
him a significant mandate in shaping India’s politics and economy in accordance with his 
interpretation of democratic socialism. Congress dominated India’s political system in the 
early years. Political opposition, where it did exist, was weak, uncoordinated, and active 
mostly at a regional level.74 Though Nehru’s vision of a self-reliant socialist-inclined 
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democracy still influences India’s political economy, modern politicians have been 
adapting his concept in the globalized economic environment. 
c. Rapid Industrialization 
At independence in 1947, the large industrial firms that provided the Indian 
economy with essential goods were mostly British and were withdrawing from the 
country along with the British government. In response, Indian politicians moved to 
quickly replace those companies with new ones that could provide the same goods and 
services. Influenced by the domestic pressures for self-reliance, India shunned foreign 
influence and sought to build its own industrial base. Politicians carved out economic 
sectors, gave each sector to a domestic firm in near-monopolistic conditions, restricted or 
taxed the import of competing foreign goods, and provided subsidies to domestic firms 
for various goods or materials related to manufacturing.75 
In order to protect the oppressed and “Other Backward Castes,”76 the state had to 
control the production process. The desire to be self-reliant and also to rapidly 
industrialize shaped industrial policies in the form of import-substitution based 
industrialization. 
d. Industrial Conglomerates 
The British colonization of India had focused on developing institutions that 
extracted resources from the sub-continent, which could then be manufactured into goods 
and sold back to India. During World War II (WWII), much of Britain’s industrial base 
was damaged by German aerial bombardment. This led to the British investing in a 
concentrated industrial base in India to help with the war effort. As described by Kohli, 
“many of these industries did rather well during the second World War, so much so that 
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‘at the time of independence… India possessed a large and fairly sophisticated modern 
industrial complex.’”77  
While Nehru and the Indian National Congress had noble intentions for 
industrializing India, maintaining social and economic equity, and gaining international 
credibility for the country, the democratic approach to accomplishing these goals ended 
up undercutting their efforts. Though the main actors were unified in their methods 
before and during the independence effort, there were substantially more actors 
influencing the political system post-independence, notably the Indian business class. 
As India began its industrialization process during World War II, a powerful 
group of conglomerates consolidated India’s industrial capacity among themselves. 
Groups such as the Tatas, Birlas, and Singhanias emerged from World War II with a 
significant amount of economic and political capital, which they used in shaping 
economic policy during and after India’s independence.78 As argued by Kohli, “the 
Achilles heel of Indian political economy [was] the mismatch between the statist model 
[of government] and the limited capacity of the state to guide social and economic 
change.”79 In other words, India’s insistence on remaining a democratic governing body 
made it challenging for politicians to enact policies that drove rapid and equitable 
industrialization partly due to the influence of industrial conglomerates in shaping 
protectionist governing policies.  
Once established, Indian conglomerates’ impact on India’s political economy was 
significant. They challenged the regulatory abilities of the Indian government, helping 
cement protectionist trade policies. Indian economist Rakesh Mohan captures the 
problem inherent in powerful conglomerates:  
It is seen in recent years that even relatively strong regulatory actions 
taken by regulators against such global [conglomerates] has had negligible 
market or reputational impact on them in terms of their stock price or 
similar metrics. Thus, there is a loss of regulatory effectiveness as a result 
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of the presence of such conglomerates. Hence there is inevitable tension 
between the benefits that such global banks bring and some regulatory and 
market structure and competition issues that may arise.80 
Though this quote references modern financial conglomerates, the challenges with 
industrial conglomerates in post-independence India were similar. When British 
corporations vacated the Indian marketplace, there were few sectors where indigenous 
companies could step in to supply the marketplace. The industries that weren’t reserved 
for the state sector were licensed out through the Industrial Policy Resolutions of 1948 
and 1956.81 As a result, Indian businesses scrambled for licenses to operate in any 
industry tangentially related to their core competencies. In this scramble, the companies 
best connected to the License Raj system thrived. By the late 1960s, a handful of 
conglomerates emerged. Among them were the Tatas and Birlas, who controlled 70 and 
203 various companies respectively.82 Since licenses were required to enter into a these 
various sectors, the companies that did manage to secure licenses prospered in the 
naturally monopolistic conditions. 
The largest threat to the conglomerates was the Indian government itself, which as 
described earlier, was envisioned by Nehru to “counteract the anti-social side of 
capitalism.”83 To manage this risk, the conglomerates were able to influence government 
officials to further restrict licensing programs and continue protectionist policies that 
provided the conglomerates subsidized raw materials as well as preventing foreign 
competition in the Indian marketplace. Furthermore, since India’s population was large 
enough to provide future growth potential, exporting into the global economy could be 
ignored. The result of this policy combination is captured succinctly by S. Manikutty, 
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“the system made the Indian enterprises (private as well as the state sectors) inefficient 
and globally uncompetitive.”84  
2. International Influences 
As significant as domestic influences were in shaping India’s industrial policies, 
they were only part of the story. Despite its leaders’ attempts to insulate the country from 
global influences, India’s policies were reflective of the international trends going on at 
the time. The development of contemporary economic thought, a non-aligned foreign 
policy, and the Cold War all exerted their influence in shaping India’ industrial strategy 
a. Post–WWII Theories of Economic Growth 
Japan emerged from devastation after World War II with a model for rapid 
industrialization, the developmental state, which set the example for developing countries 
around the world. As described earlier, the ISI system advocated for protectionist 
economic policy to help develop indigenous industrial capabilities; India’s economic 
policies at the time did not significantly depart from the conventional wisdoms. Later in 
the 20th century, the conventional wisdoms evolved, advocating for market-liberal 
economic policies, fiscal discipline of government subsidies, tax reforms, and trade 
liberalization.  
Though it sought a non-aligned economic and political path, India was not 
immune to global economic currents. Both schools of thought, protectionist and market-
liberal, influenced Indian politicians and shaped their approaches toward India’s political 
economy. 
b. Non-Alignment 
The non-aligned foreign policy emerged from centuries of European colonial rule. 
In 1947, Indian leaders were especially sensitive to the idea of having other world powers 
decide what was in their best interests and were increasingly focused on self-reliance. 
Arguably, the roots of the non-aligned ideology were already existent for several years 
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prior to India gaining independence on August 15, 1947. Frustration with years of 
economic exploitation by the British and a desire to prove economic parity with other 
countries formed the basis of a self-reliant ideology, which then evolved into an 
economic policy approach where Indians were in control of India’s future.85  
Some Indian schools of thought perceive their freedom as entirely of their own 
making, independent of global power shifts. Yet India’s ability to shake British colonial 
influence was not entirely its own doing. In the aftermath of World War II, Britain lost its 
status as a global superpower, ceding its position to the United States, and later also to the 
Soviet Union. Distracted with problems closer to home and maturing governments in its 
colonies, the British chose to relinquish control in the colonies instead of reasserting their 
power.86 The point is that India emerged from the control of a waning global hegemon 
into a world where two other rising hegemons were battling for global preeminence.87  
The American and Soviet Cold War mentality of enlisting states into their 
political and economic ideological camps had a large part of the world committed to one 
of the two camps. Seeing the effects of this global dyad, India was not inclined to side 
with either power. As stated by Rajen Harshe, “India, like a typical newly liberated state, 
wanted to protect its hard won freedom and sovereignty.”88 Indian leaders realized that 
the nature of 20th century colonialism was economic, no longer requiring the holding of 
territory by force. Nehru envisioned India different from other post–colonial nations who 
he believed were being “pushed into a neo-colonial situation where, while formal 
political independence was achieved, the erstwhile colony’s economy continued to be 
essentially dominated by metropolitan interests.”89 By committing to either the American 
or the Soviet ideology, Indian leaders feared they would be constrained to operating in 
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accordance with American or Soviet desires, effectively turning the newly independent 
country back into a reliant colony. 
c. The Cold War 
For better or worse, during this time period India found itself geographically right 
in the middle of a major friction point in the Cold War. Sitting to India’s west, the Soviet 
reach into Asia was stalled in nearby Afghanistan, balanced by the American presence in 
Pakistan. Moreover, China went from being a Soviet ally to acting on its own accord, 
adding geo-political pressure on India from the east. Though India declared itself non-
aligned, she was inevitably swayed by the influences of the three more-powerful nations 
at her doorstep. Soviet industrialist policies shaped Nehru’s ideologies and the Indian 
economy at independence but, since it was already a democracy, American leaders 
sought to bring India under the capitalist mantle as well. While the Soviet Union was 
providing Indian over one billion dollars in economic aid through the Warsaw Pact, 
Western governments and institutions were pressuring India to liberalize its economy.90 
While India never acknowledged it as a motivating factor, non-alignment allowed India 
to court both the American and Soviet blocs for economic aid. Declassified CIA reports 
estimate that India was receiving half of the two billion in foreign aid disbursed annually 
by the Soviet Union through the Warsaw Pact.91 Coupled with aid from the United 
States, India received nearly $55 billion in aid between 1951 and 1991.92 
C. THE GREEN REVOLUTION 
In the aftermath of a war with China in 1962, India found itself in a financial 
crisis as a result of droughts and food shortages. A dependence on Western powers, 
mostly the United States, made the need for agricultural reform evident to the Indian 
government. Furthermore, the human toll of the food shortages provided politicians the 
political capital required to disturb the protectionist status quo and enact some of the 
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liberalizing reforms being called for by foreign aid donors.93 In response, India 
modernized its agriculture industry by adopting new technologies such as high-yield 
variety seeds, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, modern machinery, and agricultural 
education programs. The cost of these modernizations was heavily subsidized by the 
Indian government, which now saw food self-sufficiency as fundamental to its goals of 
economic self-reliance. These significant levels of investment in the agricultural sector 
led to over 30 percent increases in crop yields, enough to feed the nation as well as drive 
industries that served the agricultural sector.94 
The green revolution of the 1960s was significant for India in three ways. First, it 
established India as a leading global agricultural producer, leading to a better financial 
situation for the country by providing it with a marketable export.95 Second, it 
demonstrated that politicians keen on driving economic reforms could leverage moments 
of crisis to enact change, a theme that returns in shaping the economic reforms of 1991.96 
Lastly, the economic successes of the green revolution enriched a new class of the Indian 
population, lower caste farmers. In doing so, it set the stage for an emergence of a middle 
class, another theme that rises to prominence after 1991.97 The green revolution is 
understood as changing the course of India’s political economy by several scholars as it 
changed the foundations of Indian political system. While it is often seen as driven by 
domestic food security concerns, it was molded by a mix of domestic and international 
influences. 
1. Domestic Influences 
The green revolution was, at its heart, a change in domestic economic policies 
that, in turn, came in reaction to a domestic food crisis. The sweeping changes that 
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resulted from the green revolution were rooted in the reforms that were part of the New 
Agricultural Strategy (NAS) policies enacted in the early 1960s. Though the groundwork 
was laid by the domestic influences of the NAS, the green revolution was triggered in 
part by agricultural stagnation and food shortages. 
a. New Agricultural Strategy 
A prevailing sentiment among some scholars is that Nehru’s early vision of 
socialism ignored agriculture in his goal of rapidly industrializing India.98 This view 
suggests that grain was imported and subsidized in an effort to keep prices low and 
encourage industrialization, and it was not until Nehru’s death and the Prime-
Ministership of Lal Bahadur Shastri that economic policies toward agriculture were 
revamped. However, the policies enacted by Prime Ministers Shastri and Indira Gandhi 
were founded on the incremental reforms enacted under Nehru’s New Agricultural 
Strategy. The NAS was a part of India’s 3rd Five-Year Plan, an economic plan for the 
country from 1961–1966. It increased the government’s focus on agriculture and wheat 
production, which were beginning to emerge as weak-points in India’s goals of 
industrializing and self-reliance. Contrasted with the 1st Five-Year Plan, NAS policies 
began investing in irrigation, fertilizer, power facilities, and educational infrastructure 
such as agriculture-focused universities and research laboratories. As described by 
Chandra et al., India began to “place great emphasis on creating the physical and 
scientific infrastructure necessary for modern agriculture… [agricultural industries] took 
their place along with steel plants as the ‘temples of modern India’ in the Nehruvian 
vision.”99  
Nehru, in the late 1950s, realized that India could not continue to produce grains 
simply by cultivating more land. Following in the footsteps of Japan and China, he 
realized that advanced technologies were necessary to increase the productive capacity of 
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existing land.100 Furthermore, the NAS identified parts of the country with geographic 
advantages to receive government assistance in modernizing their agricultural production. 
However, the interest in modernizing the agricultural sector did not last long. As 
discussed in the next section, the impact of two wars identified more immediate 
weaknesses that needed to be addressed.  
b. Agricultural Stagnation and Food Shortages 
The New Agricultural Strategy laid the groundwork for reform in that sector but 
was overshadowed by wars with China and Pakistan. After the wars, in one of which the 
Indian army suffered an embarrassing loss to China, the priority suddenly became 
modernizing the military. Money was redirected from the agricultural sector to the 
military, and the timing could not have been worse. In 1965 and 1966, India faced two 
consecutive years of drought. The marginal gains in productivity that had come out of the 
NAS were wiped out as farmlands dried up. During this period, agricultural output 
dropped by 17 percent, and food output fell nearly 20 percent.101 
The domestic pressures of the droughts were intense. The government had to 
increase food purchases from other countries, especially the United States, challenging 
the Indian ideal of self-reliance. Prime Ministers Shastri and Indira Gandhi realized that 
the famine was largely a result of India’s own protectionist economic policies. The 
country was reliant on buying grain and other commodities on the global market, but had 
no viable products for sale. The trade imbalance left India with a shortage of foreign 
exchange.102 The solution for this was two-fold. First, India would have to modernize its 
agriculture sector quickly. Second, it would have to open itself up to foreign trade. 
Although there was plenty of public support for modernizing agriculture, domestic 
pressure against economic liberalization was more intense. The concern was that if 
foreign goods were allowed to be sold in India without tariffs, it would drain the 
country’s foreign currency reserves. Initially, the solution to these domestic influences 
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was to balance against this with foreign economic aid. However, modernizing the 
agricultural sector ended up providing India with an answer to this problem as well. 
Realizing the problems with its agricultural sector, India sought help from the 
west in acquiring and developing high-yield varieties of seeds. Coupled with the 
infrastructural modernizations that had begun development under Nehru in the early 
1960s, the results of the high-yield crops were staggering. Total irrigated areas increased 
from one million hectares to 2.5 million in the early 1970s. Use of electric and diesel 
tools in farming increased five-fold, wells multiplied by a factor of four, and tractor usage 
increased nearly 450 percent. Between 1967 and 1972, this led to increased food 
production by 35 percent from 89 to 112 million tonnes.103 More importantly, food 
imports decreased nearly 70 percent by 1970. The trend continued well into the 1970s 
and eventually converted India into a net food exporter, adding to the foreign currency 
reserves that domestic leaders has earlier been concerned about depleting.104  
2. International Influences 
The green revolution resulted from a remarkable confluence of factors that, when 
combined, changed India’s economic trajectory. In analyzing the domestic factors of the 
green revolution, this paper briefly touched on two international factors. The wars with 
China and Pakistan and the food imports from the United States were both largely 
influential in shaping the conditions that allowed the green revolution to take place. 
a. Wars with China and Pakistan 
In 1962 and 1965, India fought wars with China and Pakistan, respectively. India 
decisively lost the first, and barely won the second. These wars revealed two important 
facts to Indian leaders. First, the Chinese military was far ahead of the Indian military in 
size, technology, and ability. Secondly, it underscored the reality that India was bordered 
on both sides by hostile nations. The northeast states of India could be invaded and 
claimed by China at any time, as had been the Aksai Chin border area in 1962. On the 
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west, India was contending with Pakistan over control of the Jammu and Kashmir region. 
Though Indian forces had beaten back a Pakistani invasion and captured some Pakistani 
territory, it exposed a potential future weakness.  
Both these wars occurred as India was in the process of modernizing its 
agricultural sector. Faced with more immediate existential threats, Indian politicians 
diverted economic resources away from continued agricultural modernization. The net 
effect of these conflicts was to delay India’s agricultural investment. The delay came at 
an inopportune time; as soon as the conflicts were over, the country was hit with two 
years of droughts. What was previously a poor but manageable situation degraded into a 
serious problem for Indian leaders, leading them to seek assistance from the United 
States. 
b. Food Imports from the United States 
The second significant international influence on the green revolution was India’s 
need for economic and food aid from countries it had specifically sought not to rely on. 
India found itself embroiled in a relationship with the United States without equal 
footing. It was reliant on American foreign aid to feed its population, importing over ten 
million tons of grain in 1966.105 In exchange, India found itself having to make 
concessions to American leaders.  
Turning to America for food aid was not a spontaneous occurrence. In the 1950s, 
Nehru and other Indian leaders started receiving pressure from domestic industrialists to 
pursue limited economic liberalization. Between them, the industrialists could not come 
to a consensus which, according to Sanjaya Baru, 
prevented any large scale influx of foreign capital into India… The 
absence of business avenues to enter India forced the Americans to look 
for new avenues and typically it was food which became now an important 
vehicle for penetration. The food imports of 1956 which were paid for in 
rupees gave the Americans extensive control over the economy.106  
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Thus, the United States established an economic beachhead from which it could 
influence India. With an existing relationship and logistics chain with the United States 
for food purchases, India could really only look to the U.S. for food aid. The American 
President at the time, Lyndon B. Johnson, realized that this was an opportunity to both 
pursue geopolitical initiatives and also make India adopt the economic liberalization 
reforms that the United States had also been pushing for. Right as famine conditions were 
peaking in India, the United States threatened to cancel pending aid shipments until India 
softened its stance on America’s involvement in the Vietnam War. Additionally, Johnson 
had a desire to “twist India into accepting an economic policy package favoured [sic] by 
the U.S.,” and that, “India should be put ‘on a short leash’ and what better way to do it 
than to use India’s dependence on the U.S. for food.”107 
Indian leaders recognized this attempt by the United States to influence India’s 
economy and realized they had to act. Resisting pressures from the American and Soviet 
blocs required food self-sufficiency. Whereas the 1962 and 1965 wars led to a deferring 
of investment in the agricultural sector, the need to seek food aid from the United States 
renewed a sense of focus on agricultural modernization. 
D. CONCLUSION  
The first 32 years of India’s independent history included vast amounts of change. 
The nation was born as democratic-socialist country and faced all the problems of 
industrialization that came along with that. Just as Indian leaders began recognizing some 
fundamental problems with their industrial policies, they were faced with wars, drought, 
and famine. At the end of the 1970s, India was on the verge of a major shift; it was about 
to take the first steps toward a liberalized economy. India’s path from democratic 
socialism to the first hints of liberalization was shaped by various domestic and 
international influences. The specific position that India found itself in in 1979 was a 
result of the unique confluence of domestic and international events that, in turn, shaped 
how India’s initial industrial policies and the green revolution unfolded. 
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Both international and domestic factors appear to be equally important in shaping 
India’s political economy during this period. India’s industrial policies were affected by 
Nehru’s political beliefs on self-reliance, industrialization, and the relationship between 
the public and private sectors of the economy. As one of India’s founding fathers and first 
prime minster, Nehru and his legacy played an outsize role in domestic politics, and 
therefore on India’s industrial policies. The domestic response to the green revolution 
was a continuation of Nehru’s legacy. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Nehru’s New 
Agricultural Strategy began investing in modernizing India’s agricultural infrastructure, 
an investment that proved critical to India emerging from the droughts and famine as a 
net food exporter. 
International influences factored heavily in both India’s industrial policies and its 
response to the green revolution. India’s ISI-based economic policies were informed by 
international norms that suggested this as the most effective method for developing 
countries. Furthermore, India’s non-aligned geopolitical posture precluded export-led 
development to a patron country as enjoyed by the South Korean developmental state. 
The impact of India’s wars with China and Pakistan, international food aid, and 
agricultural technologies from the United States demonstrate the international 
community’s influence on India’s green revolution. 
 Overall, India’s political economy seems to have been relatively equally affected 
by domestic and international factors from 1947–1979. Domestic influences seem to have 
been marginally more significant than international factors, but the balance is not as 
lopsided as could have been expected. Despite globalization’s minimal impacts during 
this period and India’s efforts to isolate itself from international currents, international 
factors were more consequential to the Indian political economy than expected.  
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III. INDIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY: 1980–1991 
A. 1980-1991 AT A GLANCE 
To an outside observer, the 1980–1991 time-period began unremarkably in terms 
of Indian economic policy. Policy-makers were still grasping the economic and political 
implications of the green revolution that reshaped the Indian economy. The decade began 
unexceptionally but ended with a dramatic balance of payments crisis in 1991. India’s 
reaction to the crisis is often marked in history as India’s entrance into the global 
economy. Yet, as consequential as the 1991 crisis was in redefining India’s political 
economy, it would not have been possible without the slow transition of the preceding 
decade. This chapter analyzes two significant events in India’s political economy during 
this time period: the 6th Five-Year economic plan that guided India’s economy from 
1980–1985, and the economic crises of 1991. Both events were shaped by different 
domestic and international exigencies and both played a role in the trajectory of India’s 
economic liberalization. 
B. THE 6TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1980–1985) 
The green revolution had a remarkable economic impact on India; it undermined 
the previously held notions that the government should act as a central planner. This does 
not suggest that the Indian economy was entirely decentralized after the green revolution. 
Instead, it demonstrated that the strict licensing regime was not necessary for a functional 
economy; licenses were still required, but industries could increase production without 
government approval based on their own business case.108 The successes of lower and 
middle-class farmers combined with both global and domestic political pressure, shifted 
the political calculus of populist and socialist policy-making. The most important 
document to capture this marginally liberalized approach to policy making is the 6th 
Five-Year Plan, referred to from here on as the 6th Plan. The 6th Plan laid the 
foundations for India’s eventual economic liberalization in 1991. As stated by Atul Kohli, 
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“economic growth in India started accelerating a full decade prior to liberalization [sic] of 
1991.”109  
The goals of the 6th Plan were broad, ranging from economic development to 
family planning. For the purposes of this study, the economic goals can be condensed 
down to a continued emphasis on self-reliance and overall social welfare, with the 
additional element, as observed by the Planning Commission, of “taking into account the 
failures of the past three decades of planning, recent developments,… as well as the 
vision of the future.110 This caveat is an important one. The plan acknowledges the 
impact of various recent policies and events in its formulation, such as the role that 
decentralized planning and technological investments played in enabling the green 
revolution. The following section highlights the impact of the domestic and international 
pressures. 
1. Domestic Influences 
The green revolution enriched many segments of the population that were 
previously considered outside elite social circles. Farmers, packagers, transporters, and 
others in the agricultural industries all benefited from the boom in production and the 
new policy of exporting food.111 This section will discuss the domestic influences and the 
emerging realization of an unsuccessful central-planning policy, which led to a more pro-
business approach to state-intervention.  
a. Toppling the Commanding Heights 
The commanding heights, Lenin’s term used to describe the power held over the 
economy by the state, were a large part of India’s political economy in its early years. In 
1955, Nehru’s economic advisor, P.C. Mahalanobis, created a single formula to 
administer the entire Indian economy. The prevailing sentiment was that an 
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industrialization-focused command-economy could deliver economic growth and social 
benefit.112 According to political economist Francine Frankel, the green revolution in the 
late 1960s deflated the credibility of that model.113 This realization was not isolated to 
India’s political elite. The public was also realizing the limitations of a state-run economy 
and starting to vote to that effect.114 Kohli points out that as early as 1981, around the 
same time as the launch of the 6th Five-Year Plan, the Times of India editorialized, “A 
change of considerable significance is taking place in India… the emphasis has shifted 
from distributive justice to [economic] growth.”115  
Indira Gandhi returned as the Prime Minister in 1980 after a three-year 
Emergency-induced hiatus. At that time, India was in the midst of an economic recession 
coupled with rampant inflation of over 18- percent annually.116 The lesson of the green 
revolution was that the Indian economy did not need to be as protected as industrialists 
had argued in the past and export pessimism need not be feared. Economist R. Nagaraj 
describes 1980 as a time where there was “considerable gloom about the immediate 
prospects for industrial growth, despite having a surplus of food and foreign exchange 
stocks… [Industrial growth] was widely regarded as a long-term constraint on India’s 
economic growth… [The green revolution] had provided an argument that the controls on 
output, investment, and trade–popularly called the ‘permit license raj’–were stifling 
private initiative and wasting meagre public resources.”117 The message was not lost on 
Indira Gandhi. Her return to leadership “downplayed redistributive concerns and 
prioritized growth.”118 She also adopted a more anti-labor stance to expand her alliance 
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with big business, halted public sector growth, and “demoted the significance of 
economic planning.”119 
Upon coming back into office, Indira Gandhi’s approach reflects a changed stance 
that is visible in the way the 6th Five-Year Plan was developed. The previous 
government was nearing completion of a draft economic plan when Gandhi took office in 
January 1980. One of her first actions was to annul the Indian Planning Commission’s 
plan, and redirect the commission to pursue relatively liberal economic policies. Gandhi’s 
directive to the Planning Commission to break from their existing guidance marks the 
only time in Indian history that such a drastic policy redirection occurred.120 The 6th 
Five-Year Plan was released in August 1980. It marked a significant departure from 
policies such as land reforms and anti-poverty initiatives such as “Garibi Hatao,”121 
policies Indira Gandhi had advocated for in the past.122 Her shift can be attributed to the 
changing political realities in India. A newly expanded middle class wanted more 
economic opportunities, which often came at the expense of distributive policies.123 State 
organizations were coming to the same conclusion; in 1981 the Indian Planning 
Commission conceded that, “trends in capacity utilization up to 1979/80 in major 
industries have been a source of considerable concern [because] the poor use of capacity 
represents a waste of resources and thus adds to the resource constraint.”124  
Clearly, the domestic political climate was moving from central planning toward 
market liberalization. Indira Gandhi felt she had enough political capital with the lower 
economic quintiles to implement policies advocated by the upper quintiles. As described 
by Kohli, “Gandhi and her advisors might have calculated that a realignment with big 
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capital may not be too costly, in part because the poor were already loyal to her.”125 
More importantly, Gandhi recognized that if the new approach generated economic 
growth, she could claim ownership of that in future appeals to the poorer parts of the 
electorate.  
To summarize, India’s 6th Five-Year economic plan was starkly different from 
the plans that preceded it. The plan was not notable for any particular policy, but for 
being the first official economic plan with hints of economic liberalization. Its muted 
arrival was not unintentional. The domestic political environment had begun shifting 
toward less government control. The electorate, with the wealth acquired during the green 
revolution, was able to vocalize its new prerogatives and make it politically feasible for 
the prime minister to depart from India’s previous economic trajectory. As consequential 
as the domestic imperatives were, international influences also helped shape the 6th Five-
Year Plan.  
2. International Influences 
A 2011 CATO Institute paper noted, “There was no Ronald Reagan or Margaret 
Thatcher in India: reform was a very pragmatic process.”126 There were no leaders in 
India who championed free-market economic principles. However, the international 
consensus on economics was shifting in the 1980s. South Korea had demonstrated the 
potential benefits of transitioning to a capitalist economy in the 1960s under the 
leadership of Park Chung Hee. In China, Deng Xiaoping was proving the validity of that 
model for larger countries.127 Meanwhile, India’s foreign trade was hamstring by tariffs 
and stringent caps on foreign investment. The impact of foreign trade is enmeshed with 
the domestic influences of the increasingly wealthy Indian population. With its gained 
wealth, the Indian population voiced their opinions on economic policy to political 
leaders, creating the phenomenon described in the previous section on the shifting 
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political landscape around economic policy. The purpose of this section is to analyze the 
foreign sources of India’s economic growth during this timeframe, and its impact in 
shaping domestic economic opinions. 
a. Foreign Sources of Increasing Wealth 
As mentioned earlier, India had a relatively closed economy before and during the 
green revolution. According to Koichi Fujita, though the initial impacts of the green 
revolution were noteworthy enough,  
it was the second wave that contributed significantly to increased rural 
incomes and consequently to the economic development of the country 
overall. During the 1980s, this second wave washed over the whole of 
India, buoying a large number of individual crops, including rice. The 
improvement it brought in rural incomes led to an expansion of the market 
for non-agricultural products and services, bringing in turn rapid 
development of the non-agricultural sector.128  
The growth in both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors came from both 
domestic consumption, which was growing 7.5 percent annually,129 as well as foreign 
capital in the form of trade surpluses and foreign direct investment. Foreign trade was 
highlighted in various parts of the economic plan as key to helping India pursue its 
economic goals. After a muted start to the plan, foreign exports grew beginning in 1981. 
More importantly, the variety of exports was increasing, and domestic production of 
foods and industrial goods were growing fast enough that foreign imports could be 
reduced.130 In this case, the narrative of the effects is more illustrative than the 
percentages. The export/import balances across the economy were being tilted in India’s 
favor as it began exporting agricultural and basic industrial products.131  
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) also contributed to India’s newfound wealth. FDI 
in 1976 and 1977 was effectively non-existent and did not begin to rise until the latter 
half of the green revolution in 1978. At this point, FDI kept increasing from nearly zero 
to almost $100M USD in 1981.132 Prior to 1980, foreign investment in many economic 
sectors was limited to 40 percent, and often these sectors were only ones that involved 
sophisticated technology. As a corollary to the 6th Plan, the Industrial Policy Statements 
of 1980 and 1982 took the position that FDI restrictions discouraged investment, and 
should be scaled back.133 The green revolution played an exemplary role; the high-yield 
variety seeds and crops that Indian institutions had unsuccessfully been trying to develop, 
were provided by foreign countries and helped save India from famine. FDI, it was 
argued, “could enhance efficiency by bringing superior technologies and better work 
practices.”134 Only with a more economically liberal governing regime, could India 
leverage other countries’ comparative advantages to maximize its own. 
Unlike the international influencers in the past chapter, the international 
influences to the 6th Five-Year Plan were much less overt. The correlation between the 
growing wealth of the Indian population and increased foreign economic entanglement 
was becoming obvious to politicians and the electorate alike. The domestic influence on 
shaping the economic policies manifested in the 6th Plan was a channel through which 
the growing influences of foreign capital made its mark. 
C.  THE 1991 ECONOMIC CRISIS  
The 1980–1991 decade of reforms began with a whimper. A series of policy 
prescriptions published in the 6th Five-Year Plan laid the unglamorous foundation for the 
event that closed the decade. The 1991 fiscal crisis in India was, at its heart, a balance of 
payments crisis. While the 1980s had been an era of relatively higher growth, it was, as 
described by Chandra, “not a result of any step-up of savings and investment; in many 
ways it was a result of over-borrowing and over-spending. The growth was both debt led 
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and the result of an explosion of domestic budgetary spending.”135 Though the 
incremental reforms in the past decade had helped provide the Indian economy a taste of 
globalization’s benefits, the reforms had not done enough to make India’s import/export 
balances sustainable. Due to a confluence of various domestic and international factors, 
India’s foreign debt ballooned in the late 1980s, topping $80 billion. Servicing the 
country’s debt began to occupy an pluralistic share of the annual budget, peaking at 35- 
percent in 1990.136 Finally, in mid-1991, India found itself without enough currency 
reserves for its next purchase of essential imports. Fortunately for India, the Prime 
Minister at the time, Narasimha Rao, and his economic minister, Manmohan Singh, 
recognized the gravity of the situation and were able to implement expansive reforms to 
help make the Indian economy more competitive on a global scale.  
Before delving into the domestic and international factors that shaped the 
environment around the 1991 economic crisis, it will be useful to review the policies 
enacted by Rao and Singh. These policies were tailored to address the factors that played 
a part in causing the crisis. While the reforms pursued by the minority government of Rao 
and Singh (under the Indian Congress Party) were dramatic for India, they were modest 
when compared globally. Nevertheless, they were necessary for the country to adapt to 
the global economic dynamic. The reforms consisted of a freer moving exchange rate for 
the Rupee, further liberalizing trade and industrial regulations, curbing the pervasive 
License Raj, encouraging privatization of state enterprises, further encouraging FDI, and 
reforming the financial sector to make it less insular. In short, the economic reforms were 
“an attempt to free the economy from stifling internal controls as well as equip it to 
participate in the worldwide globalization process to its advantage.”137 
The Indian economy responded quickly and positively to these changes. Within 
one year of the reforms, growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased from 0.8 
percent to 5.3 percent, eventually climbing to 7.5 percent in the following years. Virtually 
all economic metrics such as FDI, domestic savings, and industrial production 
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simultaneously ticked upward.138 Again, the narrative that emerges is more telling than 
the numbers. The Indian economy was becoming more sustainable and self-reliant. It was 
self-reliant not in the inward looking way as originally envisaged by Nehru, but in that it 
could generate enough economic growth and demand domestically to sustainably 
participate in the global market.  
Looking back at the crisis, India’s response successfully addressed the root cause 
of the crisis and set up the country to outperform its historical economic growth rates. 
The specific policies of India’s response were a product of the domestic and international 
environmental factors at the time. 
1. Domestic Influences 
Domestic politics played an enormous role in the 1991 economic crisis. Crises 
have the potential to bring opposing political parties together, as was the case in India. 
Their coalescing typically allows for a united response to the problems at hand. India’s 
response to the 1991 economic crises played out very differently. This section will 
analyze the domestic political environment as it led up to the 1991 economic crisis, and 
the unique political environment in 1991 that allowed the sweeping reform package to be 
enacted. 
a. Preceding the Economic Crisis 
The 6th Five-Year Plan was in effect from 1980–1985. As this paper suggested 
earlier, the plan was driven in part by Indira Gandhi’s force of personality. After Indira 
Gandhi was assassinated in 1984, her son Rajiv Gandhi rode a wave of popular support to 
an electoral victory in 1985, capturing 76 percent of Parliament’s lower house.139 He 
continued his mother’s reform agenda by delicensing industries, reforming corporate 
investment regulations, easing tariffs and trade barriers, and restructuring tax laws. More 
importantly, he penned several critiques of his mother’s and grandfather’s ISI based 
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economic strategy.140 Rajiv Gandhi’s economic reforms were lauded by the international 
press but criticized in India’s left-leaning domestic newspapers. Despite the domestic 
pressure, Gandhi was able to use the political capital he earned in the 1984 election to 
press reforms forward.141 
Gandhi’s political capital did not last indefinitely. His 1986 effort to cut food and 
fertilizer subsidies galvanized the populist political opposition and even gave dissenting 
voices in Gandhi’s own Congress Party the opportunity to speak out. He gradually lost 
the political support to continue enacting economic reforms in the wake of events such as 
the Bofors scandal in 1986 which implicated him of receiving kick-backs from a Swedish 
arms manufacturer, Gandhi lost the political support to continue enacting economic 
reforms.142 Gandhi realized that pushing through the extensive reforms early in his 
administration had been too abrupt and had undercut his ability to enact reforms later.143 
As described by Chandra, “the major issue of the emerging macroeconomic imbalance, 
[the] stabilization of the fiscal and balance of payments deficits, was however left 
unattended, despite the expressed intentions to the contrary.”144 Gandhi was not able to 
address the country’s fiscal imbalances during his tenure due to mounting political 
opposition. Gandhi and his Congress Party were voted out of power in 1989. Inevitably, 
an unbalanced fiscal policy, caused the economic crisis a few years later.  
1989 to 1990 was a tumultuous period in Indian domestic politics. The defeat of 
the Congress Party led to the second non-Congress led government in Indian history. The 
National Front was formed by opposing parties to counter the Congress Party Despite 
their unity in opposition to the Congress Party, this period was marked by discontent 
between the political parties in the National Front; little attention was paid to continuing 
the economic reforms. 
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Rajiv Gandhi’s early years built on the policy foundations laid by the 6th Five-
Year Plan, but they were implemented too fast for their own political sustainability. The 
second half of his tenure had fewer economic accomplishments. The lull in economic 
reforms continued during the fraught domestic political environment from 1989 to 1990. 
Rajiv Gandhi was empowered to enact his reforms by his overwhelming political victory 
that undercut his political opposition. He was later undone by his own missteps, which 
helped create a consolidated political opposition. However, the opposition did not stay 
consolidated for long. The fractious domestic political environment led to Congress 
returning to power in a multi-polar political landscape. 
b. Domestic Politics During the Crisis 
Rajiv Gandhi was campaigning to reestablish support for the Congress party in 
the 1991 elections when he was assassinated by Tamil rebels. Congress won the most 
seats during that election due in part to frustration with the previous National Front 
government as well as sympathy over Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination.145 This time the 
political landscape was very different from what the Congress Party encountered in 1985. 
Instead of the 75 percent majority it held in 1985, the Congress Party only held a plurality 
of seats in the 1991 government. What Congress had in its favor was an unorganized 
opposition. As described by Varshney, “by 1990, India’s politics had become triangular. 
Between 1950 and 1990, the principle battle-lines of politics were bipolar. The Congress 
was the party of government and all other parties were opposed to it. [After 1990], a 
triangular contest developed between the left, the Hindu nationalists, and the Congress 
party. Coalitions were increasingly formed against the Hindu nationalists, not against the 
Congress.”146  
The political opposition was consumed with infighting when the Congress party 
returned to power in 1991. Under the leadership of Narasimha Rao, Congress formed a 
minority government and later expanded it to a majority government.147 This coincided 
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with the emerging economic crisis. In mid-1991 India found itself with only 2 weeks’ 
worth of capital to cover the country’s imports.148 Without the economic reforms enacted 
by Prime Minister Rao and Manmohan Singh, India would have had to default on 
obligations. Part of the rescue efforts included a loan from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). 
The IMF required India to continue the economic reforms that had stagnated since 
Rajiv Gandhi’s administration. A large part of that was cutting the budget deficit, which 
meant cutting subsidies.149 The post-crisis reforms continued liberalizing the economy 
through the country’s annual budgets. Whereas the Congress party’s political opponents 
had collaborated to stop the economic reforms in the late 1980s, the situation in the early 
1990s was different. Domestic social issues were in the national press; Hindu nationalists 
in 1992 had destroyed India’s oldest and largest mosque, Babri Masjid.150 Babri Masjid 
and other instances of domestic violence incited by Hindu nationalists caused other 
minority political parties to coalesce in opposition to the Bharitya Janata Party (BJP), 
which was seen as a Hindu nationalist party. For instance, BJP members voted against the 
1993 budget proposed by the Congress party, but ended up being the only political party 
to vote against it. Most other minority parties voted to pass the budget in opposition to 
the BJP, not necessarily in support of the budget’s contents.151  
Political opposition continued in this vein for the next three years, allowing a 
Congress-led government to further liberalize the Indian economy. The economic 
policies were marginally more popular in the 1990s than they were in the 1980s, but the 
political opposition was distracted by and united against a different threat at the home 
front. Whereas Rajiv Gandhi enacted his reforms using his political capital, Narasimha 
Rao and Manmohan Singh enacted their reforms by capitalizing on the fragmentation of 
opposing domestic influences.  
                                                 
148 Ibid. 
149 Atul Kohli, “Politics of Economic Growth in India, 1980–2005: Part II: The 1990s and Beyond,” 
Economic and Political Weekly 41, no. 14 (2006): 1363. 
150 Chandra, Mukherjee, and Mukherjee, India after Independence, 441. 
151 Varshney, “Mass Politics or Elite Politics?,” 248. 
 49
2. International Influences 
International influences were as influential as domestic politics in shaping India’s 
economic reforms. At the peak of the 1991 crisis, India turned to emergency loans from 
international financial institutions (IFIs) to pay for its trade imbalance. The international 
influences on India’s economic reform came in the form of IFIs demanding structural 
adjustments to India’s economic policies in exchange for assistance. 
a. Influence of International Financial Institutions 
Economic models for growth in the early to mid-20th century were very different 
from the ones in the latter half of the 20th century. The policies advocated by IFIs, such 
as the World Bank, IMF, and World Trade Organization (WTO), are hugely influential 
around the world. As stated by Nobel prize winning economist Angus Deaton, “There 
may not be a world government, but there are global institutions… whose policies affect 
the incomes of people in many countries and whose activities are perhaps sufficiently 
state-like in their potential to do good and harm.”152 The IFI’s conventional wisdom used 
to dictate that debt crises and balance of payments crises could be resolved by import 
substitution and other interventionist economic policies.153 In the post–World War II era, 
the conventional wisdom began to shift toward a more market-liberal approach to 
recovering from economic crises. 
After World War II, IFIs began to suggest that “opportunities for import 
substitution were limited, and ties to the world economy had become more varied, 
complex, and difficult to sever.”154 The IMF in the 1980s started realizing that the causes 
of economic crises in most developing countries were structural and began requiring a 
“quid-pro-quo” of economic policy changes in exchange for financial assistance.155 New 
policies at the IMF and WTO were driven in part by the countries that funded their 
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operations. For instance, the United States’ contributions to the IMF currently allots it 
16.7 percent of organization’s votes.156 The United States and other European powers 
began to “strongly champion the IFIs as guardians of conditionality” in the 1980s, 
thereby defining the conditions India encountered when it approached the IMF for 
assistance in 1991.157 
When India sought emergency loans from the IMF it had to immediately transport 
several tons of gold to Europe to secure the loan.158 The IMF in return insisted on 
continued structural economic reforms. The Narasimha Rao-led Congress government 
leaned on IMF support to help implement the reforms. The IMF and other IFIs demanded 
rapid privatization of state-run enterprises, reform of regulatory structures, and most 
importantly, a drastic shift in India’s approach toward FDI.159 
Absent the economic crisis in 1991, Indian politicians would have had to contend 
with domestic politics to slowly implement reforms. The largest opposition came from 
the Indian industrialists who felt they would be disadvantaged by having to compete with 
international companies.160 While their domestic opposition could have impeded the 
process of economic reform in the past, the crises transformed the political economy of 
the country. India’s slow path from the 1980s toward liberalizing the economy was 
accelerated by the exigency of the economic crisis and the structural adjustments 
demanded by international institutions.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The 1980–1991 period was a short portion of India’s history, but one that has had 
a major impact on its economic trajectory. This decade began with a slow departure from 
the protectionist economic dogma of the past. The process began with a set of domestic 
factors influencing a change in India’s 6th Five-Year Plan, and ended with a series of 
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rapid economic liberalizing actions impelled by a combination of domestic and 
international pressures.  
Domestically, changing perceptions about the effectiveness of the government’s 
license raj and the limits of a state-run economy led to hints of economic liberalization in 
India’s 6th Five-Year Plan. Domestic party politics created an environment that first 
stifled Rajiv Gandhi’s economic reforms, and then enabled his successor to accelerate the 
pace of reforms. The international influences were borne out of domestic causal factors. 
Economic reforms from the green revolution increased India’s agricultural exports and 
encouraged investment, leading to an inflow of foreign capital. International factors 
played a larger role after the 1991 economic crisis. Global financial institutions provided 
India a fiscal lifeline but required India to resume its economic liberalization.  
Overall, this decade demonstrated that India’s domestic factors are as effective in 
shaping the country’s political economy as international factors. The inflow of foreign 
investment and capital was a result of domestic politics and reforms. After the World 
Bank provided India with liquid capital during the economic crisis, the reforms were still 
handled through domestic politics, and only informed by the international financial 
institutions. Though international institutions saved India from defaulting on its 
payments, the subsequent domestic politics were more directly responsible for shaping 
India’s political economy after the economic crisis.  
At the start of this study, the author expected that international norms and 
institutions would play a larger role in India’s political economy as the country joined the 
global community. Instead, this chapter suggests that India is either equally affected by 
both domestic and international factors, or that domestic factors are slightly more 
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IV. INDIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY: 1992–2016 
A. 1992–2016 AT A GLANCE 
The previous period ended with a dramatic shift in India’s political economy and 
change in the institutional norms on how to manage the Indian economy. The result was 
an influx of investment from international companies through manufacturing in India or 
outsourced labor.161 Indian citizens and the Indian government became wealthier as 
money flowed into the country. This period saw an acceleration in the growth of the 
Indian middle class and a change in the occupations that composed it, but also led to an 
increase in the country’s income inequality. India’s political economy since 1991 has 
been largely shaped by these two trends.  
B. GROWTH OF THE INDIAN MIDDLE CLASS 
India’s middle class has grown at a frenetic pace since the economic crisis of 
1991. Defined as the combination of the third and fourth quintiles of India’s population 
based on household income, India’s middle class is projected to grow to 520 million 
people and account for 40 percent of the global middle class by the end of the 21st 
century.162 The socio-economic benefits of a robust middle class are well documented; 
economic scholars such as John Maynard Keynes, Friedrich Hayek, William Easterly, 
and Gurucharan Das have written about the middle class’ role in perpetuating economic 
growth. A stable middle class spurs increased investment in productive capabilities, leads 
to higher levels of growth, and compels more effective governance than in societies 
without a prominent middle class.163  
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India’s middle class is no different. After being catalyzed by the 1991 economic 
reforms, the middle class quadrupled in size to 250 million people and enjoyed a nearly 
three-fold increase in per capita income.164 Another effect of the 1991 economic reforms 
was a renewed corporate interest in India with the rise of a massive new potential 
consumer base. The flow of FDI entering the economy outpaced the existing economic 
drivers of the civil-service bureaucracy and agricultural sector. As a result, the middle 
class also shifted its composition from bureaucratic and agriculture based professions to 
include entrepreneurs and service-sector workers.165 As the middle class grew, it 
accumulated wealth and began a transformation into a consumption-based economy. In 
2006, over two-thirds of India’s GDP was driven by consumption compared to only 30 
percent in 1950.166 This section reviews the domestic and international factors that 
helped rapidly enrich the Indian population and push them into middle-class status. 
India’s middle class has also had an impact on the country’s politics. India’s 
middle class has politicized religion and ethnicity leading to a growing nationalist 
sentiment throughout the country.167 Simultaneously, regional political parties and caste-
based politics have become prevalent. Leela Fernandes describes the context of these 
changes as a “reconstitution of the meaning and boundaries of citizenship” and increased 
involvement by previously politically disenfranchised groups.168 Overall, India’s political 
landscape is gaining new players while also seeing influence concentrating along various 
sub-national causes. 
1. Domestic Influences 
The Indian middle class is largely a product of the domestic political dynamics 
that resulted from the 1991 economic reforms. The economic reforms impacted the 
domestic Indian market in two ways. First, regulations on domestic companies were 
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reduced, leading to wealth accumulating within the middle and upper economic 
classes.169 Second, increasing levels of wealth changed the consumption patterns of the 
Indian consumer, providing opportunities for Indians to provide goods and services to 
their compatriots. Combined, these two domestic factors played a substantial role in the 
growth of the Indian middle class.  
a. Unburdened Domestic Companies 
The two primary effects of the 1991 economic reforms were the privatization of 
state owned enterprises and alleviating of licensing requirements. Both these domestic 
changes had outsize impacts on the Indian middle class. 
For most of India’s history, privately-run companies were seen as potentially 
harmful to society based on perceptions that they would make the rich richer and poor 
poorer.170 The global wave of privatization in the 1990s demonstrated this was not 
necessarily true. In a 2003 article, economists Nancy Birdsall and John Nellis described 
the benefits of corporate privatization as “an important element in an overall reform 
program that leads to higher growth and general job expansion... previously unemployed 
or poorly paid workers might gain jobs, or better jobs.”171 Privatization of state-owned 
firms had this same effect in India and thus contributed to the growth of the middle class. 
The Indian government divested itself of majority shares in several of its state-
owned enterprises (SOEs).172 The divestments were part of the stipulations from 
international financial institutions for monetary assistance during the economic crisis. As 
these firms shifted from public to private ownership, the benefits of privatization were 
increasingly tangible. Privatized firms experienced 3 percent higher sales, 4 percent 
higher profit, and a 17 percent higher valuation than comparable firms that remained 
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state-owned.173 More importantly, privatization was not empirically connected to a 
decline in employment and instead demonstrated a significant increase in employment. 
According to political economist Nandini Gupta, SOEs eliminated redundant positions as 
they privatized. However, as the firms became more efficient and grew, new domestic 
positions were created to enable the firm’s growth offsetting earlier job losses and 
collectively leading to a 38 percent increase in wages paid to employees.174 Not all SOEs 
were privatized in the 1990s. Nearly a quarter of previously established SOEs were 
partially privatized between 1991 and 2009. Regardless of how much equity was 
transferred to the private sector, the impact of partial privatization compared similarly to 
the ratios and percentages of SOEs that shifted majority control to private investors.175 
Partly due to this phenomenon, the average income per capita in India has tripled from 
$340 USD to $1,056 USD since 1991.176 As Indian citizens grow richer, the number of 
people who qualify as middle-class is projected to increase from 20 percent in 1995 to 41 
percent by 2025.177 
The economic reform package also included reduced licensing requirements for 
domestic firms. Data from the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy shows that the 
reforms reduced the extensive tariff regime from an average of 350 percent to 150 
percent, removed quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, and fully eliminated 
the public-sector monopoly for imports between 1991 and 1992.178 Indian businesses 
flourished under the less restrictive regulatory environment. In the following decade, the 
number of domestic companies nearly tripled from 3,031 to 8,864.179 The growth of 
domestic corporations was not limited to certain sectors, it spanned across the major 
industries of agriculture, textiles, chemicals, metals, and manufacturing. Furthermore, the 
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newly established companies were largely successful, indicating sufficient demand in the 
Indian economy for goods and services. As stated by economists Alfaro and Chari, the 
firms’ “average assets grew in the following two decades… [and] new private firms stand 
out in terms of the growth rate of their average profits.”180 
b. Organic Demand in the Indian Economy 
India’s liberalized regulations and tariff regime led to an increase in the number 
and profitability of domestic companies. As the firms expanded, their demand for 
domestic labor and expertise also grew, leading to increased hiring of domestic labor, 
specifically in the service sector. From the 1990s to mid-2000s, the service sector grew to 
account for over 50 percent of India’s GDP.181 More importantly, the increased revenues 
in the service sector did not increase the size of the middle class as much as they changed 
its composition. Fernandes describes this phenomenon:  
At a structural level, the new middle class is… defined by a change in the 
status of jobs, which now signify the upper tiers of middle class 
employment. The socioeconomic boundaries of the new middle class are 
shaped by this shift in the direction of new middle class employment 
aspirations. In symbolic terms, the cultural and economic standard for the 
“old” middle class would have been represented by a job in a state bank or 
the Indian civil service. Members of the new middle class aspire to jobs in 
[the service sector].182 
The 1991 economic reforms were a catalyst for economic growth in India. 
Domestic firms took advantage of their newfound freedoms and expanded to cater to the 
expanding Indian market. The growing national economy and increased national wealth 
spurred domestic consumer demand. Sensing an opportunity, Indians rose to provide 
goods and services that international companies could not quickly respond to. By 
spending their accumulated capital, members of the middle class spurred demand 
                                                 
180 Ibid., 3238. 
181 Fernandes, India’s New Middle Class, 1274. 
182 Ibid. 
 58
throughout the country.183 Industries that once only provided goods and services to 
Indian elites began to serve the increasingly affluent middle class as well. Sufficient 
domestic demand for goods and services created opportunities for a new group of people 
who provided goods and services to eventually become part of the statistical middle class 
as well.184 
2. International Influences 
The 1991 economic reforms made the Indian market more lucrative for foreign 
firms as well as domestic companies. Chapter III discussed India’s first foray into raising 
FDI limits in the 1980s and the impacts it had on the Indian economy. This section 
analyzes the effects of FDI on the Indian middle class in the 1990s and 2000s.  
a. FDI’s Contribution to India’s Middle Class 
Historically, India had an industrial licensing system that effectively prevented 
any private investment in certain sectors of the economy. This system was first relaxed in 
the 1980s but was not significantly deregulated until the 1990s with “every [subsequent] 
year seeing further relaxation of restrictions.”185 Multinational corporations quickly 
recognized the value propositions in India; an English-speaking population with 
significantly lower labor costs could provide services to the Western world for a low cost. 
Within ten years, the number of foreign companies in India grew nearly 50 percent from 
533 to 748 across every economic sector that saw FDI limits relaxed.186 
Most multinational companies that came to India were part of the Information 
Technology (IT) industry. Between 1994 and 2000, the number of foreign IT companies 
grew at an annual rate of 50 percent and accounted for 2 percent of India’s GDP, and 18 
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percent of its total exports.187 More importantly, the burgeoning IT sector employed over 
650,000 Indians at a median salary 17 percent higher than the second highest paid 
industry.188 
Various other industries also benefited from an FDI boom and grew relative to 
their historical size, leading to a small subset of the Indian population getting wealthier 
and joining the middle class. However, their impact on the middle class ended up being 
less significant than initially expected. Atul Kohli describes the post-1991 FDI 
environment: 
The role of [FDI] in India has increased since 1991, though not 
dramatically. [FDI] has averaged some $3 billion per annum [from 1991–
2015]; it was as high as $35 billion in 2009, though it declined quite 
sharply–by as much as a third, to some $24 billion–in 2010… [These 
numbers] are small when compared to foreign investment inflows into 
China during the same period (nearly $100 billion in 2010). Investment 
has grown rapidly in India… [but] within this changing economy, 
indigenous big business houses continue to be the most significant.189 
Kohli suggests that while FDI-induced economic growth is helpful in driving 
growth of the middle class, it is not as potent as homegrown investment. Frankel takes a 
similar approach, saying “the new knowledge-based industries in which India is set to 
excel–and for which the [1991] reforms vastly multiply our comparative advantage– will 
not create that [number] of jobs we require.”190 The narrative of FDI playing a 
consequential role in the growth of India’s middle class is an easy one to believe. 
However, the data suggests that while FDI was useful in expanding the middle class in 
some economic sectors, its impacts were relatively isolated.191 Instead, domestic demand 
and investment proved to be more effective in expanding India’s middle class.  
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C. INCREASING INCOME INEQUALITY 
Collectively, Indian citizens have undoubtedly grown richer since 1991; the 
country’s GDP and per-capita income have grown by over 6 percent annually in the last 
three decades.192 As discussed in Chapter III and earlier in this chapter, much of that 
growth can be attributed to the 1991 economic reforms. However, there are also negative 
impacts to the country’s growing wealth. Kohli describes the situation in India:  
Unfortunately, this ‘new’ India remains a country of numerous poor, 
illiterate, and unhealthy people… The pro-business tilt of the Indian state 
[after 1991] is responsible both for the progressive dynamism at the apex 
and for the failure to include India’s numerous excluded groups in the 
polity and the economy.193 
Leela Fernandes also applies the growing inequality to its impact on the middle 
class, saying that the economic success since the 1990s has “reinforced sociocultural 
distinctions that separate the middle class from the poor and working classes.”194  
Literature on India is full of both data and anecdotal accounts that demonstrate the 
severe disparities. A 2010 New York times article highlighted this disproportion when 
profiling the world’s most expensive private residence, a 27-story building in Mumbai 
that cost $1 billion to build. The building stands amidst one of Asia’s largest slums, 
housing over one million people, in a city where over 60 percent of the population lives 
in poverty.195 The economic disparities span multiple dimensions. Inequality has 
manifested itself across India’s geographic regions, urban versus rural divide, and class 
lines.196 
Economic inequality across India’s regions and states is evident when comparing 
their annualized GDP growth over the past 20 years. India’s five poorest states (Assam, 
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh) grew at an average annual rate of 4.7 
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percent, but the five richest states (Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra, Punjab, and Tamil 
Nadu) grew 1.5 times faster.197 Furthermore, the population of poorer Indian states tends 
to be higher. Per India’s 2011 census, the population of India’s five richest states has 
grown 84 percent in the preceding decade, and accounts for 25 percent of India’s total 
population. However, the population of the five poorest states has nearly doubled in the 
same period and now accounts for 38 percent of India’s total population.198 Overlaying 
the economic and population metrics reveals that rich states are getting wealthier, but the 
population growth is occurring in the poor states.199 This is captured in the per capita 
incomes of the states. In 1991, the per capita income of India’s poorest state, Bihar, was 
one-third of the per capita income in India’s richest state, Maharashtra. Since 1991, 
Bihar’s per capita income has fallen to 25 percent of Maharashtra’s.200  
The existence of severe levels of income inequality in India is difficult to refute. It 
has been an unexpected by-product of the same economic reforms that enriched different 
subsets of the Indian population. This section will analyze domestic and international 
dynamics which factor into the India’s increasing economic inequality. 
1. Domestic Influences 
India’s growing income inequalities can be attributed to two predominant causal 
factors. First, there is significant regional diversity across India on approaches toward 
economic growth. Second, the poorer electorate’s preference for alleviating the 
symptoms of economic inequalities instead of the root causes.  
a. Regional Diversity 
India’s national elections in 2014 were dominated by economic concerns. At the 
root of Narendra Modi’s overwhelming win was his record of achieving economic 
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successes in his home state of Gujarat.201 Underlying the economic policies were 
somewhat market-liberal policies that enabled easy access to permits and licenses, quick 
environmental clearances for incoming investments, and more efficient governance by 
government agencies and their civil servants.202 The business-friendly approach led 
Gujarat to the nation’s fastest GDP and job growth and earned his economic policies the 
colloquial nickname, “Modinomics.”203 Similar economic policies can be found in all of 
India’s fastest growing states and are critical to understanding the growing regional 
inequality throughout India.204 
In contrast to Gujarat’s Modinomics, India’s poorest states tend to have less 
efficient governing institutions and their policies have a decidedly neo-patrimonial tilt. 
Politics in these states are driven by personalities and often result in a poor investment 
climate.205 In these states, such as Bihar, Orissa, and Madhya Pradesh, the poorest parts 
of the electorate have far fewer economic opportunities available but their numbers afford 
them recognition by politicians. Instead of pursuing policies that would spur economic 
growth, politicians readily appeal to class, caste, and regional nationalism.206 Political 
leaders in India’s lesser performing states aim government resources at redistributive 
efforts such as food and fuel subsidies, welfare programs, and anti-capitalist/elitist 
sentiments. Kohli describes the net result of this approach to governance as:  
With the state’s political class focused on everything but the state’s 
development, a variety of socioeconomic problems continue to 
accumulate: poor infrastructure; the decay of major public institutions, 
including universities; the deterioration of law and order; and widespread 
corruption. This is not a context conducive to attracting private 
investment.207 
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The implication, as suggested by patterns in the demographic and economic data, 
is that rich states grow their economies faster than poor states due to more comprehensive 
pro-business policies. For instance, politicians in Gujarat have prioritized 
industrialization and pro-industry policies, leading to a developmental-state type 
atmosphere that has enriched its population.208  
On the other hand, poorer states with weaker governing institutions focus on 
state-led economic growth, a model richer states have moved away from. Furthermore, 
their policies are less cohesive. West Bengal, for example, has publicized its goals to be 
an “investor-friendly climate”209 while simultaneously pursuing policies that deter 
private investment such as land reform, which returned parcels of land to peasant farmers 
for agricultural use; faltering investment in educational and medical infrastructure; and 
adopting government policies based on the preferences of rent-seeking political elites.210  
Corruption and rent-seeking practices are another measure of regional diversity in 
economic policies. The same business-friendly approaches that are credited for 
catapulting economic growth in states such as Gujarat and Maharashtra are also potential 
threats to the region’s political elites. Jennifer Bussell suggests that economic reform 
poses a risk to corrupt elites by threatening the “corrupt income derived from 
manipulation of state institutions.”211 Reducing corruption is a corollary to economic 
reforms in India. The states that benefit most from pro-business policies and economic 
reforms are the same ones that can overcome opposition from local and regional elites.  
b. Focus on Direct Poverty Alleviation 
The politics in India’s poorer states accentuate the growing income inequality 
through policies that are geared toward placating the electorate and “direct” versus 
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“indirect” measures for poverty alleviation.212 Direct measures are government initiatives 
that aim to directly reduce the symptoms of poverty and are characterized by “income 
transfers” to poorer electorates.213 Direct measures can include programs such as 
government-sponsored employment programs, subsidies on consumer staples, and land 
reforms that transfer ownership to the poor. Indirect measures are aimed towards 
changing the economic environment to foster private investment and perpetuating 
economic growth. India has a long history of applying direct measures in efforts to 
reduce poverty across the nation. Direct measures had mixed results and the conventional 
wisdom has evolved toward market liberalization to achieve economic growth. Poorer 
states in India apply direct measures to lower their economic inequalities with higher 
frequency than India’s richer states; direct measures are less effective in resolving the 
causal factors of economic inequality.214  
Politicians in India’s poorer states are partly forced to adopt direct measures due 
to their electorates. As explained by Varshney, “direct methods have clearly 
comprehensible and demonstrable short-run linkages with the well-being of the poor… 
[whereas] the impact of indirect methods on poverty is not so immediate.”215 
Democratically elected politicians in poor areas are limited by their electorate’s affinity 
for welfare programs. The poor electorate is often comprised of multiple ethnic, religious, 
or caste-based subgroups. These “demand groups” regularly spawn their own political 
leaders who rise to power by dividing the poor electorate into groups.216 Upon gaining 
power, their largest political threats come from leaders of other minority groups. 
Therefore, the incentive of political leaders is to mollify their own electorate in the short-
term, ensuring their continued electoral loyalty. Direct measures to address poverty 
                                                 
212 Ibid., 269. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Frankel, India’s Political Economy 1947–2004, chap. 14. 
215 Varshney, Battles Half Won, 270. 
216 Rudolph and Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi, chap. 9. 
 65
accomplish this task far more effectively than indirect measures that may take years to 
produce economic benefits.217 
The combination of regional diversity in terms of economic policies and short-
term measures aimed at reducing poverty are the two strongest domestic factors in India’s 
growing income inequality. However, international trends also play a role in shaping 
India’s economic disparities. 
2. International Influences 
Richard Florida’s “The World is Spiky” challenges the paradigm that 
globalization has made innovation and economic growth accessible to everyone 
throughout the world.218 Instead, Florida suggests that the effects of globalization are 
compartmentalized in parts of the world due to the country’s demographic dispositions 
and comparative advantages. The effects of globalization are similarly concentrated 
within countries like India. 
a. Localized Globalization 
This thesis has catalogued the historically restrictive trade and economic policies 
that impacted India’s political economy. Many of these policies have been rolled back or 
repealed in the past three decades and the impacts have been profound for the Indian 
economy. One of India’s recent progression toward a market-liberal economy is the 
creation of special economic zones (SEZ) which draw in dozens of multi-national 
companies due to more liberal economic laws than the rest of India. 
India’s SEZ policy was created in the 1960s but gained momentum in 2000 when 
India partly reformed its legal framework. The result was a program similar to one that is 
credited for sparking China’s economic boom in the 1980s and 1990s.219 The SEZ policy 
is credited with bringing nearly $15 billion USD of investment into India, and creating 
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over 500,000 jobs between 2000 and 2007.220 Despite the large numbers, the quantitative 
benefit of the zone was minor at the national aggregate level. More importantly, SEZs 
launched a wave of international companies establishing a corporate presence in India. 
There were 212 SEZs established in India from the 1960s to 2006, the bulk of which 
formed after 2000. In the decade since 2006, the number of unique SEZs has grown to 
nearly 1,000 across 13 Indian states..221  
International companies established in India and hired large numbers of Indian 
workers, effectively creating a constituency that directly benefited from an expanding 
SEZ policy. International companies have used their footholds in India’s SEZs to lobby 
politicians such as Sonia Gandhi for similarly relaxed economic policies and additional 
SEZs.222 Opposing parties argue that any new SEZ will have to be built on farmland, 
weakening India’s food security and displacing large numbers of farmers and local 
villages. Furthermore, critics argue that international companies will be best positioned to 
capitalize on the opportunity, resulting in unpredictable and uneven growth for Indian 
companies.  
The impact of the SEZs has been very localized benefits to India’s political 
economy. The residents and employees in SEZs, such as Cyber City outside New Delhi, 
are largely in favor of the program, but there is less appreciation for the program in parts 
of the country not working with an SEZ. The local economies of SEZs throughout India 
have displayed symptoms reminiscent of the resource curse, leading to high valuations of 
labor in industries represented by the SEZ but low wages and employment opportunities 
for those in other professions.223 Farmers are usually the most disadvantaged by SEZs 
and have launched many successful efforts to resist new SEZs throughout India, arguing 
that India is not legally allowed to seize private property to advantage international 
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companies. The result has been a series of legal battles challenging the efforts of 
international companies to globalize small portions of India.224 
D. CONCLUSION 
The post economic reform period in India’s history is marked by a series of steps 
toward continued economic liberalization and an increasingly wealth population. 
However, the growing wealth has been limited to certain sectors of the population and is 
spread disproportionately around the country. Both hallmarks of this period’s political 
economy, increasing wealth and inequality, have been shaped by domestic and 
international factors. The growing wealth and size of India’s middle class has been 
impacted by the growth of domestic companies just as much as it has by foreign 
investment in India, if not more so. The indigenous demand for goods and services within 
India has allowed Indian companies and entrepreneurs to leverage the country’s massive 
internal market to both enrich themselves and bring new products and technologies to 
their compatriots. The wealth generated by Indian and international companies within 
India has disproportionately benefited the people and regions who were best suited to 
capitalize on the new economic dynamics. Regional diversity, an electorate focused on 
the symptoms of poverty instead of causes, and localized globalization driven by India’s 
special economic zones have contributed to the country’s increasing income inequality. 
Interestingly, India’s political economy has become more reliant on domestic 
factors than international as the country has become more globalized and politically and 
economically interconnected. Chapter III of this thesis assessed that even the most 
notable international influences to India’s economy can be traced back to domestic causal 
factors. FDI played a role in growing India’s middle class, but a relatively minor one 
compared to the domestic demand for goods and services or the growth of Indian 
companies. Localized globalization through the Special Economic Zones has a noticeable 
impact, but is derived from variations in domestic economic policy.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The political economy of any country is constantly in flux. As is the case in India, 
domestic and international factors sway the economic policies the country’s government 
undertakes. While researching how domestic and international factors affected India’s 
political economy, the author expected that international factors would be increasingly 
important to India’s economic posture. This was based on an assumption that as India’s 
economy globalized, international market forces would force India to quickly liberalize 
its economy to the same levels as Western markets in Europe or the United States. 
Instead, India has retained control over its economic policies while also joining the global 
market economy. As mentioned in the conclusions for Chapters III and IV, even the most 
impactful international influences to India’s economy can be directly traced back to 
causal factors borne out of domestic pressures.  
The strength of India’s domestic factors in shaping its economic policies was not 
apparent immediately after independence. Chapter II discussed India’s economy policies 
from 1947 to 1979, a period where the two major events were both seemingly ripe for 
domestic factors to hold sway. Instead, India’s industrial policies seem to have been 
equally motivated by domestic leaders’ ideologies as well as international norms that 
suggested protectionist policies such as ISI. The green revolution was also equally 
impacted by domestic and international factors. India’s domestic agriculture policies 
were important, but appear to have been vulnerable to international factors such as wars, 
food aid, and agricultural imports controlled by other countries.  
Perhaps India’s leaders realized they were susceptible to international forces, a 
concept that Jawaharlal Nehru was staunchly opposed to. The two following economic 
periods, discussed in Chapters III and IV, demonstrated that no matter the nature of major 
events in India’s economic history, domestic factors played a noticeably larger role in 
shaping their outcomes. The 6th Five-Year Plan, 1991 economic crisis, growth of India’s 
middle class, and increasing income inequality were all shaped by domestic politics and 
causal factors more heavily than international ones. Despite its increasing exposure to 
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global markets, trade, and politics, India retained much more autonomy over its economy 
than the author expected.  
One answer seems most persuasive when exploring why India was able to 
maintain economic sovereignty to the degree it did. As discussed in Chapter I, India is 
currently the world’s second most populous country, and expected to be the most 
populous country within a decade.225 Additionally, the country’s growing GDP gives it 
the leverage to attract foreign capital and investment due to its large domestic market and 
dictate economic policies on its own terms.226 Global trends and norms might tilt India, 
but the country has the population and economic potential to move in whichever direction 
it chooses; a power that India exercises with increasing frequency. In retrospect, this is 
not the first historical example of a country leveraging its size to dictate its own 
economic trajectory. China’s exponential economic growth followed the same basic 
formula and invalidated countless predictions that it would have to fully liberalize its 
economy in order to sustain economic growth.227 The question that remains is whether 
having a massive population and lucrative economic potential is a useful tool or an 
economic crutch for India’s economy. Unfortunately, China’s example has not yet 
provided a clear answer to this question, but India’s example provides arguments for it 
being both a tool and a crutch. 
India’s current prime minister, Narendra Modi, launched his flagship economic 
development program “Make in India” upon taking office in 2014.228 The program was 
designed to recruit foreign companies to manufacture their products in India through a 
carrot-and-stick based approach. Companies were enticed to manufacture their products 
in India through the increase of SEZs, potential tax and tariff benefits, and by easier 
access to hundreds of millions of Indian consumers.229 If that were not enough, 
international companies are coerced into manufacturing in India through import tariffs as 
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high as 300 percent.230 The policy appears to be working: the electronics giant, Apple, is 
supplementing production of its iPhones with a factory in India largely for easier access 
to the lucrative Indian consumer market.231 
There are also potential risks to leveraging India’s population in order to dictate 
economic policies. The Indian consumer’s purchasing power is high in the aggregate but 
relatively low on a per-capita basis when compared globally.232 Companies with more 
expensive products may be dis-incentivized to manufacturing in India if the potential for 
lower tariffs and lower prices will not be help it appeal to enough Indian consumers. In 
situations such as this, Indian consumers who do seek out these products will be forced to 
higher prices than consumers around the world. Furthermore, there is the normative 
debate about if fully liberalized economies are better for economic growth than market 
economies that also have government intervention; this revisits the neo-classical 
economics arguments between Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek, which is discussed in 
Chapter I. 
Looking at the history of India’s political economy reveals a country that is 
increasingly shaping its economic policies on its own terms, and leaving less room for 
international influence. India’s economy will be the country’s most effective tool for 
projecting power in the 21st century. Economics impels India’s ability to modernize its 
military, support human rights around the world, ease tensions between India and its rival 
neighbors, and lift millions of its citizens out of poverty. India’s economic growth is 
becoming a defining aspect of the global economy in the 21st century with implications 
for companies and governments throughout the world. 
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